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HIGH COURT VOIDS RACE-BASED PLANS FOR REDISTRICTING
The New York Times
Friday, June 14, 1996
Linda Greenhouse
Invoking its precedents against the use of race
in legislative districting, the Supreme Court today
invalidated one Congressional district in North
Carolina and three in Texas as the product of
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. All four
districts had been drawn after the 1990 census to
give minority voters more electoral influence.
The twin 5-to-4 rulings took a big, although still
inconclusive, step toward answering the question
raised by two earlier rulings: whether any districts
drawn with race in mind will overcome the
presumption that using race, at least as a
predominant factor, is unconstitutional. The rulings,
in 1993 and last year, made majority-black districts
open to legal challenge by disaffected white voters
and subject to searching scrutiny under the 14th
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
Lawyers representing black voters said today
that more and more, it appeared that no districts
would pass muster. "The noose is tightening,"
Elaine Jones, director-counsel of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., said in an
interview. Laughlin McDonald, director of the
southern regional office of the American Civil
Liberties Union, predicted the result would be the
"bleaching of Congress" as well as state and local
legislative bodies, as new districts drawn across the
South to increase minority representation fall under
legal attack.
The approach the Court took in the decisions
today appears to commit it to an intensive,
case-by-case review of these districts. The decisions
encompassed 189 pages and, in the Texas case,
included a detailed analysis of the three challenged
districts, in a plurality opinion by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor.
Rejecting pleas from the four dissenters to
reverse course and back away from applying the
strictest constitutional scrutiny to majority-black
districts, Justice O'Connor said: "We see no need to
revisit our prior debates." The Court's precedents
"acknowledge voters as more than mere racial
statistics," she said.
The rulings produced widespread confusion in
both North Carolina and Texas, where the
incumbents from the four affected districts are all
seeking re-election and where primaries have
already taken place and filing deadlines are passed.
Now that the districts have been declared
unconstitutional, the special three-judge Federal
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District Courts that presided over the litigation in
each state will have to decide whether to permit the
November elections to proceed under the existing
lines, whether to draw new lines themselves, or
whether the state legislatures must be summoned
back into session.
"It's unclear where we are headed now," said
Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson, the incumbent in one
of the majority-districts in Texas, the 30th
Congressional District, which is in the Dallas area.
The other affected districts are the 29th in Texas, a
majority-Hispanic district in Houston that is
represented by a non-Hispanic Democrat, Gene
Green, the 18th in Houston, a majority black district
represented by Sheila Jackson Lee; and the 12th in
North Carolina, a majority-black district that
follows a narrow 160-mile course along Interstate
85, represented by Mel Watt.
The second majority-black district in North
Carolina, the 1st, was also challenged, but the Court
dismissed that challenge because none of the white
plaintiffs actually lived in the district.
The Court spoke with a splintered rather than
clear voice today. There was no majority opinion in
the Texas case, Bush v. Vera, No. 94-805, which
served as the lead case of the pair. Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor wrote a plurality opinion for herself,
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, and Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy. Justices Clarence Thomas
and Antonin Scalia, who agreed that the Texas
districts were unconstitutional, refused to sign
Justice O'Connor's opinion because it held open at
least the theoretical possibility that a district could
take race into account and still be constitutional.
"All racial classifications by government must
be strictly scrutinized and, even in the sensitive area
of state legislative redistricting, I would make no
exceptions," Justice Thomas said in a concurring
opinion that Justice Scalia also signed.
Both Justices John Paul Stevens and David H.
Souter wrote dissenting opinions, each of which was
also signed by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer.
The North Carolina decision, Shaw v. Hunt, No.
94-923, was less equivocal, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist writing a relatively brief 19-page opinion
that was joined, without separate concurrences, by
the other four who made up the majority in the
Texas case. The difference was due in part to the
fact that the Court had no need for a close review of

the facts in the North Carolina case, which had been
before the Justices under the name of Shaw v. Reno
in 1993.
The 1993 decision held for the first time that a
district drawn to provide a black majority, and
challenged by white voters, was subject to the
strictest scrutiny under the 14th Amendment's equal
protection guarantee: that is, that it could be
justified only by a "compelling state interest" and
had to be "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest.
In the 1993 ruling, the Court had sent the North
Carolina districts back to the District Court in
Raleigh to see if they could be justified under that
standard.
The District Court upheld the two districts,
finding that they were narrowly tailored to serve
North Carolina's compelling interest in complying
with the Voting Rights Act and in eradicating the
effects of discrimination that had kept the state
without a black representative in Congress between
1901 and 1992.
In his opinion today, the Chief Justice said that
whatever justifications might be available in theory,
the lack of compactness in the skinny, 160-mile
district showed it was not "narrowly tailored" to
achieve the state's goal.
The Texas case was a greater challenge for the
Court, not only because the shape of the districts
was not quite so extreme but also because the state
and the black voters who were defending the
districts argued strongly that whatever role race had
played in drawing particular lines, it was not the
predominant factor. Rather, they said, old-fashioned
partisan politics and the traditional desire to protect
incumbents led to the particular choices and
departures from compactness and regularity.

Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion agreed that
"it is clear that race was not the only factor" and
accepted the argument that even if race also played
a part, the traditional factors of party and
incumbent-protection could justify the irregular
districts as long as the traditional districting criteria
were not "subordinated to race."
However, in examining each district, she then
concluded that race was not only one factor but was
the dominant one. She noted that in drawing the
lines, the legislature used a computer program that
provided racial data on a block-by-block basis,
while other data such as party registration and past
voting records were available only at the
precinct-by-precinct level.
A special three-judge Federal District Court in
Houston had invalidated the three districts, and
Justice O'Connor said that in doing so, the court had
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"ample bases on which to conclude" not only that
race was more important than politics in the
redistricting, but that "political gerrymandering was
accomplished in large part by the use of race as a
proxy."
"Significant deviations from traditional
districting principles, such as the bizarre shape and
noncompactness demonstrated by the districts here,
cause constitutional harm insofar as they convey the
message that political identity is, or should be,
predominantly racial," Justice O'Connor said.
In his dissenting opinion in the North Carolina
case, Justice Stevens addressed the question of what
message racially-conscious redistricting actually
conveys. He concluded that it was impossible for the
Court to say. "I know of no workable constitutional
principle," he said, "that can discern whether the
message conveyed is a distressing endorsement of
racial separatism, or an inspiring call to integrate the
political process."
Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in the
Texas case, said the path on which the Court had
embarked in the 1993 Shaw v. Reno decision, from
which he also dissented, had proven unworkable.
Calling for "withdrawal from the presently
untenable state of the law," Justice Souter said it
was time "to admit Shaw's failure in providing a
manageable constitutional standard and to allow for
some faith in the political process."
There was some sense in the opinions today that
the Court's center of gravity has not completely
settled. In the Texas case, Justice O'Connor wrote
an unusual concurring opinion -- in effect,
concurring with herself -- in which she distanced

herself from her allies and said she agreed with the
dissenters that compliance with the Voting Rights
Act can itself be a "compelling state interest" that
can justify the conscious creation of a compact,
majority black district. The other four Justices in the

majority had declined to decide that question.
One indication of how the Court will approach
the next round of cases could come quickly. Before
the term ends this month, the Court is due to act on
an appeal from a District Court ruling late last year
that the majority-black Fourth Congressional
District in Louisiana is unconstitutional because
race was the predominant factor in its creation. The
Court could affirm that ruling summarily, on the
basis of today's decision, or it could accept the
appeal for argument and a full ruling, which would
be an indication that it intends to continue
examining each case.
The New York Times Copyright 1996

SUPREME COURT REJECTS RACIALLY DRAWN DISTRICTS
The Record
Friday, June 14, 1996
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder News Service
In 1993, the justices first doubted the validity
of the same black congressional district in North
Carolina that was struck down Thursday.

In another defeat for minorities growing
political clout, the U.S. Supreme Court on
Thursday ruled, 5-4, that predominantly black and
Hispanic congressional. districts in Texas and
North Carolina were unconstitutionally drawn
primarily for racial reasons.
The justices, splitting precisely the way they
did in earlier confrontations over the
constitutional role of race in voting, placed a
lengthening legal cloud over all districts
specifically designed to ensure the election of
minority representatives.
The nullified districts were bizarrely shaped
and violated the Constitution's promise of racial
equality by subordinating "traditional" criteria,
such as compactness and community boundaries,
to racial factors, the court's conservative majority
said.
But Justice John Paul Stevens, one of four
liberal-leaning dissenters, accused the court of
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Of that district, it was said that "if you drove

down the interstate with both doors open, you'd
kill most of the people in the district."
President Clinton, who enjoys strong support
from minority voters, said he was disappointed by
the ruling and urged minorities to "work even
harder to make sure their voices are heard."
Minority voters and minority members of
Congress are overwhelmingly Democratic.
But the campaign to create majority-minority
districts has drawn fire from people who see it as
a form of affirmative action that provides special
favors for minorities and nullifies the ideal of a
colorblind society.
"For the govemment to ... target the election
ofpeople by race, that's wrong," said Robinson 0.
Everett, a Durham lawyer who represented white
challengers in North Carolina.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said the Texas
districts, two majority-black districts in Dallas
and Houston and a largely Hispanic district in
Houston, were improperly drawn predominantly
on racial factors.
O'Connor, writing for three of the five
conservative justices in the majority, emphasized
the bizarre shaping of the districts, which she said
"intensifies the emphasis on race." The designers
of the districts, she said, showed "utter disregard"
of city limits and local precinct lines.
The North Carolina ruling nullified one of
two predominantly black districts that produced
the first black members of Congress from the
state in 90 years. But both are certain to be
affected by the requirement that the state revise its
entire districting plan.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist scolded
the state legislature and the U.S. Justice
Department for pursuing a policy of
"maximizing" the number of majority-black
districts in the state. Such a practice was
condemned by the court last year in a voting rights
case from Georgia.
A Justice Department official improperly
advised a North Carolina legislator that "you have
22 percent black people in this state, you must
have as close to 22 percent black congressmen, or

establishing a double standard in which "minority

voters can make up a majority only in compact
districts .. . while white voters can be placed into
districts as bizarre as the state desires."
Civil rights lawyers called the ruling a
disaster for minority representation, not only in
Congress, but also in state legislatures and on city
councils and school boards, where the court's
constitutional guidelines also apply.
"Like the Southern churches being set afire, I
think this decision torches the effective political
participation of black and brown people," said
Elaine R. Jones, director-counsel of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, a leading advocate of
minority election districts.
"The Supreme Court keeps changing the rules
and it's demoralizing," Jones said. "Now they tell
us if the district is compact it may survive
constitutional scrutiny. So I'll spend the next
couple of years making sure they're compact and
go to the Supreme Court and what will happen
then? The court hasn't yet seen a Southern
majority-minority district it likes."
A year ago, the court struck down a primarily
black Georgia congressional district, saying the
laudable goal ofracial equality "is neither assured
nor well-served .. . by carving electorates into
racial blocs."
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The Voting Rights Act requires the states and
the courts to cure racial inequality that has
historically drawn electoral districts to dilute the
voting power of minorities.
The 14th Amendment, as interpreted by the
court, requires the justices to view racial
considerations by the government with great
suspicion.
In addition to O'Connor and Rehnquist, the
majority consisted of Justices Anthony Kennedy,
Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. However,
in the Texas case, they did not agree on their
underlying reasons.
Scalia and Thomas said racial considerations
can never be used to draw a predominantly
minority district. The other three said challengers
to such a district must prove that race was the
predominant factor.
In a separate concurring opinion, O'Connor,
who cast the pivotal vote, explained that racial
factors could still be used to deliberately create a
predominantly minority district.
The ACLU's McDonald was not mollified.
O'Connor has written before that she is open to
race-based districts but "she relentlessly votes to
districts
congressional
these
strike
down,"McDonald said.
Stevens, who dissented along with Justices
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
Breyer, portrayed the voting rights cases as more
about politics than race.
Challengers of the controversial North
Carolina districts, he said, were white Republican
voters whose "real grievance is that they are
represented in Congress by Democrats."
Copyright 1996 Knight Ridder Tribune

black congressional districts, in this state,"
Rehnquist said.
The invalidated 12th District in North
Carolina, which meanders through the state for
160 miles, is represented by a black Democrat,
Melvin Watt of Charlotte.
The Texas districts found unconstitutional are
the 18th, represented by Sheila Jackson Lee,
D-Houston; the 29th, represented by Gene Green,
D-Houston; and the 30th, represented by Eddie
Bernice Johnson, D-Dallas.
O'Connor said Green's 29th District has been
likened to "a sacred Mayan bird with its body
running eastward along the Ship Canal. Spindly
legs reach south to Hobby Airport . .. a plumed

head

rises

northward

almost

to

Intercontinental . .. an open beak appears to be

searching for worms in Spring Branch."
The Texas and North Carolina cases will be
returned to lower courts for decisions on when
their districts must be redrawn.
The court's rulings came at a time when
Congress has reached a historic peak of racial
diversity. Its membership includes 40
African-Americans, all but four of whom came
from districts in which most of the voters are
black.
There also are 17 Americans of Hispanic
descent, five Asian-Americans, and one Native
American in Congress.
In deciding the validity of majority-minority
districts, the Supreme Court found itself torn
between the Voting Rights Act and the 14th
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the
laws.
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DEMOCRACY DEMEANED
The New York Times, Editorial Desk
Saturday, June 15, 1996
One hundred years after the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson
set back the cause of racial justice by approving the doctrine of "separate but
equal," a majority of current Court members have demonstrated a perverse
determination to resegregate the nation's politics. A century from now,
fair-minded Americans are bound to view the Court's evisceration of the Voting
Rights Act this week with regret and even shame.
In a pair of 5-to-4 decisions, the Court invalidated one Congressional district
in North Carolina and three others in Texas that were drawn after the 1990
census to give minority voters more electoral influence - countering a long
tradition of discrimination and political exclusion. Together these rulings propel
the Court further down the path it embarked upon three years ago by making
majority-black districts open to legal challenge by white voters disaffected by the
effort to increase minority representation. Inso doing, the Court has committed
itself to intense case-by-case review of newly created minority districts, applying
the strictest constitutional scrutiny while trivializing the democratic value of
including minority voters more fully in the political process.
Seizing upon the odd shapes of the districts, the Supreme Court held that
state legislators, under pressure from the Justice Department to comply with the
Voting Rights Act, had improperly emphasized race while subordinating other
traditional redistricting principles, notably geographical compactness. As she has
before, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor couched her opinion in lofty language
emphasizing the Court's responsibility to minimize race as a factor in government
decision-making.
It is of course easy to ridicule the meandering nature of the districts. But if
the Court wanted to place a limit on the creative cartography of state lawmakers,
it might at least have done so in an evenhanded way. As John Paul Stevens noted
in powerful dissent, the Court's ruling means that "minority voters can make up
a majority only in compact districts, whether intentionally or accidentally drawn,
while white voters can be placed into districts as bizarre as the state desires."
Justice O'Connor and her colleagues engaged in all sorts of contortions to
make their point They had to ignore the troubling history of discrimination that
gave rise to the Voting Rights Act and the regrettable but inescapable fact that
racially polarized voting makes it hard to elect minority candidates in
majority-white districts. They also had to ignore compelling evidence especially in the Texas districts - that the odd shapes resulted from a messy and
hard-to-disentangle mix of factors, not least the desire for a statewide
redistricting plan that preserves the seats of white incumbents.
Finally, they had to ignore the will of Congress when it enacted an effective,
if imperfect, remedy to racial injustice. The Court that minorities must rely upon
to protect their political rights has now made it much harder for them to have
their voices heard. The tangible impact is certain to be a diminution in the
number of African-American and Hispanic lawmakers in Congress and state
legislatures, and not just in the South. With so much still to be done to address
society's racial strains, this is a result the nation can ill afford.
The New York Times Copyright 1996
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THE LINES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN'
Court Erases Cynical Practice of Redistricting by Race
The Phoenix Gazette, Editorial/Opinion
Friday, June 28, 1996
John Kolbe
State Rep. Ruben Ortega, who's retiring this
year after four terms, may be getting out just in
time.
As the premier home-grown practitioner of the
racial line-drawing arts, the jolly Huachuca City
Democrat forced not one, but two, revisions of the
1990 legislative redistricting exercise, until he was
finally satisfied that his southeast Arizona district
was safe for Hispanic candidates.
But Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor and four of her colleagues have just dealt
a blow to his artistic hobby.
They threw out four contorted congressional
districts in North Carolina (where the 12th District
snaked 160 miles along an interstate highway
widening out only to pick up pockets of black
voters) and Texas because they "convey the message
that political identity is, and should be,
predominantly racial....
"The 14th Amendment," wrote O'Connor in
Bush vs. Vera, "requires us to look with suspicion
on the excessive use of racial considerations by
government" and to "eliminate unnecessary ...
reinforcement of racial stereotypes."
Americans of good will should cheer their
decision.
Oddly enough, Ortega does. "I played by the
rules at the time," he said, "and I have no regrets.
But I do regret that it was so divisive in the district.
I actually agree the Supreme Court was wise. It said
we were too obsessive and excessive in putting
certain colors in certain districts."
But most minority activists reacted, well . . . one
might say, excessively.
"At night, the enemies of civil rights strike in
white sheets," said the always restrained Jesse
Jackson. "By day, they strike in black robes." The
New York Times noted ominously that "the noose is
tightening."
Ortega is closer to the mark than either. The
obsession he cites, based on the 1975 Voting Rights
Act and its 1982 revisions, is what this fight is
about
Under merciless demanding and haranguing by
a politically correct Justice Department, states have
struggled in the last two redistricting cycles to draw
as many districts as possible with a majority of

ethnic minority voters, known in the trade as
"majority-minority" districts.
The assumption underlying the demand was an
ugly notion at odds with the very idea of America,
i.e., that black or Hispanic candidates can get
elected only if the ethnic deck is stacked in their
favor.
Tell that to J.C. Watts. The black one-time
Oklahoma football star was elected in 1994 by a
nine-point margin as a Republican in a district with
a 7 percent black population. (A white Democrat
had won 71 percent in the district two years earlier.)
Or to Gary Franks, another black Republican who's
been elected twice in a Connecticut district that's 5
percent black.
Or tell Illinois Democrat Carol Moseley-Braun,
the second black senator since Reconstruction, in a
state with a 15 percent minority contingent.
Are they aberrations? Yes, if history is any
guide. But aberrations that make the point - times
are changing, and changing for the better, thank
God. Racial divisions have not yet disappeared, of
course, but they are narrowing every day.
And what the court is doing, however
uncertainly, is ridding us of one of the most
insidious inventions by the racial engineers to
perpetuate those divisions.
You'd think that a man with political antennae
as finely tuned as Jackson's might wonder about the
strange ally he's had in this battle for more assured
black seats - a cynical Republican party. If he did,
he'd understand what the GOP does - that as more
minorities (mostly reliable Democratic voters) are
crammed into a few districts to ensure ethnic
majorities, the better Republicans do in the
adjoining areas.
Although there were other factors at work, it's
no coincidence that the GOP has gone from a 2-1
deficit in House seats in states of the old
Confederacy to a solid 68-57 majority in only eight
years and one redistricting of the race-stuffing era.
This practice has devastated more than the
Democratic party. It has harmed the very minorities
it's designed to help.
How? By cramming them into their very own
apartheid-like bantustans, we have marginalized
them politically. There's only a handful of white
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congresspeople who represent enough blacks or
Hispanics to pay more than perfunctory attention to
their concerns. Conversely, in districts with 50 to 75
percent minority concentrations, white constituents
get short shrift. Perversely, as their numbers in
Congress increase, their overall influence wanes.
Alone, black legislators can do little to better
the lot of blacks, for they'll always be a small
minority. What can help are policies that unite rather

than divide people, and those require each segment
of society to believe it has a stake in the others.
Jackson's vituperation aside, what's left is a
simple reality - this isn't about black representation,
but guaranteed seats.
"The members who are screaming that their
constitutional rights are being infringed upon,"
wrote respected analyst Charles Cook, "are really
saying that they have a right to a safe seat . .. to a
district that they don't have to break a sweat to
hold."
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Consider these statistics. In 1994, one of the
worst Democratic elections ever, there were 34
black Democrats seeking re-election. Not one lost.
Ditto with Hispanics. Among black members, Cook
notes, only three won with less than 60 percent of
the vote; 25 polled over 70 percent. Plainly, black
congresspeople are in little danger.
In fact, a black House member has not lost a
general election (several have lost primaries to other
blacks) since 1934.
Unfortunately, while O'Connor left room for
"appropriate and reasonably necessary uses of race"
in redistricting, she left no guidelines to what they
are, trusting the states to be "capable of
distinguishing" what's legally allowable.
Which is why Ortega may take up his hobby
again sometime. "But next time," he laughs, "I'll be
billing by the hour."
The Phoenix Gazette Copyright 1996

FAIRNESS: WE'LL KNOW IT WHEN WE SEE IT
The Washington Post
Monday, June 24, 1996
William Raspberry
"I shall not today attempt further to define the
kind of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand definition [of hard-core
pornography] and perhaps I could never succeed
in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it."
The late Justice Potter Stewart, who wrote
those words in a concurring opinion in a 1964
pornography case, might have felt right at home
in the current court.
This court, in its latest visit to congressional
redistricting, declined to embrace any definition
of an unconstitutionally odd-shaped district. Nor
did it suggest what degree of race consciousness
on the part of the drafters is too much or even tell
us why it is all right for people who map districts
to pay serious attention to party affiliation or
incumbency protection -- but not to race.
The justices -- at least a plurality of them -could have expressed their views regarding what
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor described as
excessively "bizarre" districts by borrowing
Potter Stewart's words: I know it when I see it.

I know it too. I get a queasy feeling just
looking at some of the districts the court
examined in its latest decisions (and some it
didn't examine as well). Nor is it merely the
bizarre shapes of the districts that bother me. I'm
bothered as well by the notion that it's in the
interest of black Americans to create a
black-majority district by stripping surrounding
districts of their black voters.
But I'm bothered more by the court's
bumbling inability to settle the districting debate
in any way that candidates, voters or
legislator-drafters can rely on. As with the
pornography case, the court virtually guaranteed
the controversy will be kept alive. And as with
Justice Stewart, the reason is the insistent search
for the nonexistent -- in the redistricting cases,
the search for a solution that is constitutional,
rational, politically acceptable and fair, without
rewriting existing law.
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The drafters of the district maps -- state
legislatures -- are in an impossible situation. The

Voting Rights Act forbids them to dilute minority
voting strength, and the Supreme Court forbids
them to draw shapes that are too weird. The only
guarantee is that somebody will sue, and the
court will have to do the whole dance again.
But the rules under which the legislators must
work imply standards that are nonexistent. A
dilution of minority voting strength from what?
From what it was before the new district
boundaries were drawn? From the best possible
shot for minorities to elect the greatest possible
number of members? The bizarreness
disqualification suggests a previously existing
paragon of compactness and neatness.
But there never were any electoral
checkerboards. Districting maps have always
been political documents, and the court says they
may go on being political documents. They still
may, without any requirement for compactness,
be drawn to protect incumbency. They can be
drawn to retain disproportionate party strength.
They can be drawn (as in Arizona) to make sure
that the Hopi and the Navajo have different
representatives. Only race is an illegitimate
motive, the court says.
And its majority will be aghast when the
result is to reduce by half or more the number of
black members of Congress.
The court has made -- and keeps making --

two fundamental errors. First (as has been said in
a different context) it has made the perfect the
enemy of the good. In a perfect America, race
would be of no electoral significance. In the
actual America, race matters, no matter how
fervently the court majority wishes it didn't.
The second error is its refusal to distinguish
between "gerrymanders" created to preserve an
unfair distribution of political power and
"bizarre" boundaries created to move us closer to
fairness. It's like refusing to distinguish between
the doctor's slap on a newborn's rump and a
stranger'schild abuse; like charging a paramedic

with battery for pounding on your chest to get
your heart beating again.

the oddly shaped districts that the court has
struck down in recent cases,"

Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, stressed the
distinction the majority keeps missing:

"Rather than attach
he wrote. Then:
blameworthiness to a decision by the majority to
share political power with the victims of past
discriminatory practices," the court ought to
concern itself with the palpable and admitted
partisan abuse of power.

"The court-imposed barriers limiting the
shape of the district will interfere more
directly with the ability of minority voters to
participate in the political process than did
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The Washington Post Copyright 1996

George W. BUSH, Governor of Texas, et al., Appellants,
V.

Al VERA et al.
Supreme Court of the United States
116 S.Ct. 1941
June 13, 1996
Justice O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE
CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice KENNEDY join.
This is the latest in a series of appeals involving racial gerrymandering challenges to state redistricting
efforts in the wake of the 1990 census. That census revealed a population increase, largely in urban minority
populations, that entitled Texas to three additional congressional seats. In response, and with a view to
complying with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), the Texas Legislature promulgated a redistricting plan
that, among other things: created District 30, a new majority-African-American district in Dallas County;
created District 29, a new majority-Hispanic district in and around Houston in Harris County; and
reconfigured District 18, which is adjacent to District 29, to make it a majority-African-American district.
The Department of Justice precleared that plan under VRA § 5 in 1991, and it was used in the 1992
congressional elections....
We must now determine whether those districts are subject to strict scrutiny. ...
Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. Nor
does it apply to all cases of intentional ceation of majority-minority districts ... .For strict scrutiny to apply,
the plaintiffs must prove that other, legitimate districting principles were "subordinated" to race. By that,
we mean that race must be "the predominant factor motivating the legislature's [redistricting] decision.". . .
The present case is a mixed motive case. The appellants concede that one of Texas' goals in creating the
three districts at issue was to produce majority- minority districts, but they also cite evidence that other goals,
particularly incumbency protection. . ., also played a role in the drawing of the district lines. The record does
not reflect a history of "purely race-based" districting revisions. A careful review is, therefore, necessary to
determine whether these districts are subject to strict scrutiny. But review of the District Court's findings of
primary fact and the record convinces us that the District Court's determination that race was the
"predominant factor" in the drawing of each of the districts must be sustained. ...
Several factors other than race were at work in the drawing of the districts .... Districts 18 and 29
maintain the integrity of county lines; each of the three districts takes its character from a principal city and
the surrounding urban area; and none of the districts is as widely dispersed as the North Carolina district
held unconstitutional in More significantly, the District Court found that incumbency protection influenced
the redistricting plan to an unprecedented extent ..This finding receives inferential support from the fact that
all but one of Texas' 27 incumbents won in the 1992 elections. And the appellants point to evidence that in
many cases, race correlates strongly with manifestations of community of interest . . and with the political
data that is vital to incumbency protection efforts, raising the possibility that correlations between racial
demographics and district lines may be explicable in terms of nonracial motivations....
Strict scrutiny would not be appropriate if race-neutral, traditional districting considerations
predominated over racial ones. We have not subjected political gerrymandering to strict scrutiny....
If the State's goal is otherwise constitutional political gernymandering, it is free to use the kind of political
data on which Justice STEVENS focuses-precinct general election voting patterns, precinct primary voting
patterns, and legislators' experience-to achieve that goal regardless of its awareness of its racial implications
and regardless of the fact that it does so in the context of a majority-minority district. To the extent that the
District Court suggested the contrary, it erred. But to the extent that race is used as a proxy for political
characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation.... If the promise of the
Reconstruction Amendments, that our Nation is to be free of state-sponsored discrimination, is to be upheld,
we cannot pick and choose between the basic forms of political participation in our efforts to eliminate
unjustified racial stereotyping by government actors.
Here, the District Court had ample bases on which to conclude both that racially motivated
gerrymandering had a qualitatively greater influence on the drawing of district lines than politically motivated
gerrymandering, and that political gerrymandering was accomplished in large part by the use of race as a
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proxy. The State's own VRA § 5 submission explains the drawing of District 30, and the rejection of
Johnson's more compact plan, in exclusively racial terms...
As the District Court noted, testimony of state officials in earlier litigation (in which District 30 was
challenged as a political gerrymander). . . affirmed that "race was the primary consideration in the
construction of District 30." And Johnson explained in a letter to the Department of Justice written at the end
of the redistricting process that incumbency protection had been achieved by using race as a proxy... This
is not to say that the direct evidence of the districters' intent showed race to be the sole factor considered....
Finally, and most significantly, the objective evidence provided by the district plans and demographic
maps suggests strongly the predominance of race. Given that the districting software used by the State
provided only racial data at the block-by-block level, the fact that District 30, unlike Johnson's original
proposal, splits voter tabulation districts and even individual streets in many places, suggests that racial
criteria predominated over other districting criteria in determining the district's boundaries. And, despite the
strong correlation between race and political affiliation, the maps reveal that political considerations were
subordinated to racial classification in the drawing of many of the most extreme and bizarre district lines....
The combination of these factors compels us to agree with the District Court that "the contours of
Congressional District 30 are unexplainable in terms other than race." It is true that District 30 does not
evince a consistent, single-minded effort to "segregate" voters on the basis of race. But the fact that racial
data were used in complex ways, and for multiple objectives, does not mean that race did not predominate
over other considerations. The record discloses intensive and pervasive use of race both as a proxy to protect
the political fortunes of adjacent incumbents, and for its own sake in maximizing the minority population of
District 30 regardless of traditional districting principles. District 30's combination of a bizarre, noncompact
shape and overwhelming evidence that shape was essentially dictated by racial considerations of one form
or another is exceptional.. .That combination of characteristics leads us to conclude that District 30 is subject
to strict scrutiny...
Having concluded that strict scrutiny applies, we must determine whether the racial classifications
embodied in any of the three districts are narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. Appellants
point to three compelling interests: the interest in avoiding liability under the "results" test of VRA § 2(b),
the interest in remedying past and present racial discrimination, and the "nonretrogression" principle of VRA
§5 (for District 18 only). We consider them in turn.
A
Section 2(a) of the VRA prohibits the imposition of any electoral practice or procedure that "results in
a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color." . . . A violation

exists if "based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class
of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."
Appellants contend that creation of each of the three majority-minority districts at issue was justified by
Texas' compelling state interest in complying with this results test.
As we have done in each of our previous cases in which this argument has been raised as a defense to
charges of racial gerrymandering, we assume without deciding that compliance with the results test, as
interpreted by our precedents, can be a compelling state interest. We also reaffirm that the "narrow tailoring"
requirement of strict scrutiny allows the States a limited degree of leeway in furthering such interests. If the
State has a "strong basis in evidence" for concluding that creation of a majority-minority district is reasonably
necessary to comply with § 2, and the districting that is based on race "substantially addresses the § 2
violation," it satisfies strict scrutiny. We thus reject, as impossibly stringent, the District Court's view of the
narrow tailoring requirement, that "a district must have the least possible amount of irregularity in shape,
making allowances for traditional districting criteria."
... [W]e adhere to our longstanding recognition of the importance in our federal system of each State's
sovereign interest in implementing its redistricting plan. Under our cases, the States retain a flexibility that
federal courts enforcing § 2 lack both insofar as they may avoid strict scrutiny altogether by respecting their
own traditional districting principles, and insofar as deference is due to their reasonable fears of, and to their
reasonable efforts to avoid § 2 liability. And nothing that we say today should be read as limiting "a State's
discretion to apply traditional districting principles," in majority-minority, as in other, districts. The
constitutional problem arises only from the subordination of those principles to race.
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Strict scrutiny remains, nonetheless, strict. The State must have a "strong basis in evidence" for finding
that the threshold conditions for §2 liability are present: "first, 'that [the minority group] is sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district'; second, 'that it is politically
cohesive'; and third, that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . .usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate."' And, as we have noted above, the district drawn in order to satisfy § 2 must
not subordinate traditional districting principles to race substantially more than is "reasonably necessary"
to avoid § 2 liability. Districts 18, 29, and 30 fail to meet these requirements.
We assume, without deciding, that the State had a "strong basis in evidence" for finding the second and
third threshold conditions for § 2 liability to be present. We have, however, already found that all three
districts are bizarrely shaped and far from compact, and that those characteristics are predominantly
attributable to gerymandering that was racially motivated and/or achieved by the use of race as a proxy....
These characteristics defeat any claim that the districts are narrowly tailored to serve the State's interest
in avoiding liability under §2, because §2 does not require a State to create, on predominantly racial lines,
a district that is not "reasonably compact." If, because of the dispersion of the minority population, a
reasonably compact majority- minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not require a majority-minority
district; if a reasonably compact district can be created, nothing in § 2 requires the race-based creation of
a district that is far from compact.
.... In determining that strict scrutiny applies here, we agreed with the District Court that in fact the
bizarre shaping and noncompactness of these districts were predominantly attributable to racial, not political,
manipulation. The United States' argument, and that ofthe dissent, address the case of an otherwise compact
majority-minority district that is misshapen by predominantly nonracial, political manipulation ... .The
districts before us exhibit a level of racial manipulation that exceeds what § 2 could justify.
B
A State's interest in remedying discrimination is compelling when two conditions are satisfied. First, the
discrimination that the State seeks to remedy must be specific, "identified discrimination"; second, the State
"must have had a 'strong basis in evidence' to conclude that remedial action was necessary, 'before it embarks
on an affirmative action program.' " Here, the only current problem that appellants cite as in need of
remediation is alleged vote dilution as a consequence of racial bloc voting, the same concern that underlies
their VRA § 2 compliance defense, which we have assumed to be valid for purposes of this opinion. We
have indicated that such problems will not justify race-based districting unless "the State employ[s] sound
districting principles, and ... the affected racial group's residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating
districts in which they will be in the majority." Once that standard is applied, our agreement with the District
Court's finding that these districts are not narrowly tailored to comply with § 2 forecloses this line of defense.
C
... As a result of Hispanic population increases and African-American emigration from the district, its
population had reached 35.1% African-American and 42.2% Hispanic at the time of the 1990 census. The
State has shown no basis for concluding that the increase to a 50.9% African-American population in 1991
was necessary to insure nonretrogression. Nonretrogression is not a license for the State to do whatever it
deems necessary to insure continued electoral success; it merely mandates that the minority's opportunity
to elect representatives of its choice not be diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State's actions....
IV

... Both dissents contend that the recognition of the Shaw I cause of action threatens public respect for,
and the independence of, the federal judiciary by inserting the courts deep into the districting process. We
believe that the dissents both exaggerate the dangers involved, and fail to recognize the implications of their
suggested retreat from Shaw I.
... [W]e believe that today's decisions, which both illustrate the defects that offend the principles of
Shaw I and reemphasize the importance of the States' discretion in the redistricting process will serve to
clarify the States' responsibilities. The States have traditionally guarded their sovereign districting
prerogatives jealously, and we are confident that they can fulfill that requirement, leaving the courts to their
customary and appropriate backstop role.
This Court has now rendered decisions after plenary consideration in five cases applying the Shaw I
doctrine. The dissenters would have us abandon those precedents, suggesting that fundamental concerns
relating to thejudicial role are at stake. While we agree that those concerns are implicated here, we believe
they point the other way. Our legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to stare decisis, especially in
such sensitive political contexts as the present, where partisan controversy abounds. Legislators and district
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courts nationwide have modified their practices--or, rather, reembraced the traditional districting practices
that were almost universally followed before the 1990 census--in response to Shaw I. Those practices and
our precedents, which acknowledge voters as more than mere racial statistics, play an important role in
defining the political identity of the American voter. Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a
commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and reinforcement of racial
stereotypes....
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.

...
Justice O'CONNOR, concurring....
Although I agree with the dissenters about §-2's role as part of our national commitment to racial
equality, I differ from them in my belief that that commitment can and must be reconciled with the
complementary commitment of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to eliminate the unjustified use of
racial stereotypes. At the same time that we combat the symptoms of racial polarization in politics, we must
strive to eliminate unnecessary race-based state action that appears to endorse the disease.
Todays decisions, in conjunction with the recognition of the compelling state interest in compliance with
the reasonably perceived requirements of § 2, present a workable framework for the achievement of these
twin goals....
First, so long as they do not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for its own sake
or as a proxy, States may intentionally create majority-minority districts, and may otherwise take race into
consideration, without coming under strict scrutiny. Only if traditional districting criteria are neglected and
that neglect is predominantly due to the misuse of race does strict scrutiny apply.
Second, where voting is racially polarized, § 2 prohibits States from adopting districting schemes that
would have the effect that minority voters "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to ...
elect representatives of their choice." That principle may require a State to create a majority-minority district
where the three Gingles factors are present--viz., (i) the minority group "is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," (ii) "it is politically cohesive,"
and (iii) "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . .. usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate."
Third, the state interest in avoiding liability under VRA § 2 is compelling. If a State has a strong basis
in evidence for concluding that the Gingles factors are present, it may create a majority-minority district
without awaiting judicial findings. Its "strong basis in evidence" need not take any particular form, although
it cannot simply rely on generalized assumptions about the prevalence of racial bloc voting.
Fourth, if a State pursues that compelling interest by creating a district that "substantially addresses" the
potential liability, and does not deviate substantially from a hypothetical court-drawn § 2 district for
predominantly racial reasons.
Finally, however, districts that are bizarrely shaped and non-compact, and that otherwise neglect
traditional districting principles and deviate substantially from the hypothetical court-drawn district, for
predominantly racial reasons, are unconstitutional....
Justice KENNEDY, concurring. [OMITTED]
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice SCALIA joins, concurring in the judgment [OMITTED]
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER join, dissenting.
. .First, I believe that the Court has misapplied its own tests for racial gerrymandering, both by applying
strict scrutiny to all three of these districts, and then by concluding that none can meet that scrutiny. In
asking whether strict scrutiny should apply, the Court improperly ignores the "complex interplay" of political
and geographical considerations that went into the creation of Texas' new congressional districts ... .1would
follow the fair implications of the District Court's findings, and conclude that Texas' entire map is a political,
not a racial, gerrymander.
Even if strict scrutiny applies, Iwould find these districts constitutional, for each considers race only to
the extent necessary to comply with the State's responsibilities under the Voting Rights Act while achieving
other race-neutral political and geographical requirements. The plurality's finding to the contrary
unnecessarily restricts the ability of States to conform their behavior to the Voting Rights Act while
simultaneously complying with other race-neutral goals.
Second, even if Iconcluded that these districts failed an appropriate application of this still-developing
law to appropriately read facts, I would not uphold the District Court decision....
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... Much of Dallas and Houston, for example, was already represented in Congress by Democrats, and
creating new Democratic districts in each city while ensuring politically safe seats for sitting Representatives
required significant political gerrymandering. This task was aided by technological and informational
advances that allowed the State to adjust lines on the scale of city blocks, thereby guaranteeing twists and
turns that would have been essentially impossible in any earlier redistricting....
It is clear that race also played a role in Texas' redistricting decisions ... .Given the omnipresence of §
2 of the Voting Rights Act, the demographics of the two communities, and the pressure from leaders of the
minority communities in those cities, it was not unreasonable--and certainly not invidious discrimination of
any sort--for the State to accede to calls for the creation of majority- minority districts in both cities.
While complying with a multitude ofother political and legal requirements, then, Texas created three new
majority-minority congressional districts and significantly reconfigured one pre-existing district. The District
Court concluded that the State impermissibly emphasized race over nonracial factors when it drew two of
these new districts (District 30 in Dallas and District 29 in Houston) and the reconfigured District 18 in
Houston. To determine whether the Court correctly affirms that decision, I begin, as does the plurality, by
asking whether "strict scrutiny" should be applied to the State's consideration of race in the creation of these
majority-minority districts.
We have traditionally applied strict scrutiny to state action that discriminates on the basis of race....
.Racial gerrymandering of the sort being addressed in these cases is "discrimination" only in the sense that
the lines are drawn based on race, not in the sense that harm is imposed on specific persons on account of
their race.
... For strict scrutiny to apply. . . the plaintiff must demonstrate that "the legislature subordinated
traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, [and]
respect for political subdivisions ... to racial considerations."

Of course, determining the "predominant" motive of the Texas Legislature is not a simple matter. The
members of that body faced many unrelenting pressures when they negotiated the creation of the contested
districts. . . In such a constrained environment, there will rarely be one "dominant and controlling" influence.
Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Dallas' District 30 where, at the very least, it is clear that race was
not such an overriding factor.
... Despite all the efforts by the plurality and the District Court, then, the evidence demonstrates that
race was not, in all likelihood, the "predominant" goal leading to the creation of District 30. The most
reasonable interpretation of the record evidence instead demonstrates that political considerations were. In
accord with the presumption against interference with a legislature's consideration of complex and competing
factors, I would conclude that the configuration of District 30 does not require strict scrutiny.
V
The Houston districts present a closer question on the application of strict scrutiny. There is evidence
that many of the same race-neutral factors motivating the zigzags of District 30 were present at the creation
(or recreation) of Districts 29 and 18. In contrast to District 30, however, there is also evidence that the
interlocking shapes of the Houston districts were specifically, and almost exclusively, the result of an effort
to create, out of largely integrated communities, both a majority-black and a majority-Hispanic district. For
purposes of this opinion, then, I am willling to accept arguendo the court's conclusion that the Houston
districts should be examined with strict scrutiny. Even so, the Court errs by concluding that these districts
fail that test.
The first unintended outcome of the legal reasoning in Shaw I and Bush is the very result that those
decisions seek to avoid: The predominance of race in the districting process, over all other principles of
importance. Given the Court's unwillingness to recognize the role that race-neutral districting principles
played in the creation of the bizarrely shaped districts in both this case and Shaw H, it now seems clear that
the only way that a State can both create a majority-minority district and avoid a racial gerrymander is by
drawing, "without much conscious thought," and within the "limited degree of leeway" granted by the Court,
the precise compact district that a court would impose in a successful §2 challenge. After the Court's
decisions today, therefore, minority voters can make up a majority only in compact districts, whether
intentionally or accidentally drawn, while white voters can be placed into districts as bizarre as the state
desires....
By minimizing the critical role that political motives played in the creation of these districts, I fear that
the Court may inadvertently encourage this more objectionable use of power in the redistricting process....
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The history of race relation in Texas and throughout the South demonstrates overt evidence of
discriminatory voting practices through the 1970's....
Perhaps the state of race relations in Texas and, for that matter, the Nation, is more optimistic than might
be expected in light of these facts. If so, it may be that the plurality's exercise in redistricting will be
successful. Perhaps minority candidates, forced to run in majority-white districts, will be able to overcome
the long history of stereotyping and discrimination that has heretofore led the vast majority of majority-white
districts to reject minority candidacies. Perhaps not I am certain only that bodies of elected federal and state
officials are in a far better position than anyone on this Court to assess whether the Nation's long history of
discrimination has been overcome, and that nothing in the Constitution requires this unnecessary intrusion
into the ability of States to negotiate solutions to political differences while providing long-excluded groups
the opportunity to participate effectively in the democratic process. I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
When the Court devises a new cause of action to enforce a constitutional provision, it ought to identify
an injury distinguishable from the consequences of concededly constitutional conduct, and it should describe
the elements necessary and sufficient to make out such a claim. Nothing less can give notice to those whose
conduct may give rise to liability or provide standards for courts charged with enforcing the Constitution.
Those principles of justification, fair notice, and guidance, have never been satisfied in the instance of the
action announced three Terms ago in Shaw v. Reno, when a majority of this Court decided that a State
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by excessive consideration of race in drawing
the boundaries of voting districts, even when the resulting plan does not dilute the voting strength of any
voters and so would not otherwise give rise to liability under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, or
under the Voting Rights Act.
. .Shaw I addressed a putative harm subject to complaint by any voter objecting to an untoward
consideration of race in the political process. Although the Court has repeatedly disclaimed any intent to go
as far as to outlaw all conscious consideration of race in districting, after three rounds of appellate litigation
seeldng to describe the elements and define the contours of the Shaw cause of action, a helpful statement of
a Shaw claim still eludes this Court....
Today's opinions do little to solve Shaw's puzzles or return districting responsibility to the States ... .The
price of Shawl, indeed, may turn out to be the practical elimination of a State's discretion to apply traditional
districting principles, widely accepted in States without racial districting issues as well as in States
confronting them.
. . .[T]he Court has to recognize that Shaw's problems result from a basic misconception about the
relation between race and districting principles. . .
II
Shawls recognition of a misuse ofrace in districting even when no vote dilution results thus rests upon
two basic deficiencies: first, the failure to provide a coherent concept of equal protection injury, there being
no separably injured class and no concept of harm that would not condemn a constitutionally required remedy
for past dilution as well as many of the districting practices that the Court is seeking to preserve; second, the
failure to provide a coherent test for distinguishing a "predominant" racial consideration from the application
of traditional districting principles in a society whose racial mixture is politically significant and where
racial-bloc voting exists....
Along with this endemic unpredictability has come the destruction of any clear incentive for the States
with substantial minority populations to take action to avoid vote dilution. . . .
As a consequence, where once comprehensible districting obligations confronted the legislators and
governors of the States, there is now a vacuum of responsibility in any State with the mixed population from
which Shaw suits come....
Although today's cases do not address the uncertainties that stem from Shaw's underlying incoherence,
they do aim to mitigate its inscrutability with some specific rules.
A
In each of today's cases, the Court expressly assumes that avoiding a violation of the Voting Rights Act
qualifies as a sufficiently compelling government interest to satisfy the requirements of strict scrutiny. While
the Court's decision to assume this important point arguendo is no holding, the assumption itself is
encouraging because it confirms the view that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts is not
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necessarily a violation of Shaw I, and it indicates that the Court does not intend to bring the Shaw cause of
action to what would be the cruelly ironic point of finding in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee....

B
The second point of reference to come out of today's cases is the rule that if a State begins its
map-drawing efforts with a compact majority-minority district required by Gingles, the State may not rely
too heavily on racial data in adjusting that district to serve traditional districting principles.. .[I]t is in theory
and in fact impossible to apply "traditional districting principles" in areas with substantial minority
populations without considering race....
C
The third point of reference attributable to today's cases is as yet only a possibility; a suggestion in the
discussions of the narrow tailoring test that States seeking to avoid violating § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
may draw the district that the Voting Rights Act compels, and this district alone....
D
In sum, the three steps the Court takes today toward a more definite cause of action either fail to answer
the objections to Shaw l or prompt objections of their own....
IV
...
[T]he Court's options for dealing with Shaw's unworkability are in truth only these: to confine the
cause of action by adopting a quantifiable shape test or to eliminate the cause of action entirely. Because even
a truncated Shaw would rest on the untenable foundation I have described, and the supposed, expressive harm
Shaw seeks to remedy is unlikely to justify the disruption that even a modified Shaw would invite, there is
presently no good reason that the Court's withdrawal from the presently untenable state of the law should not
be complete. While I take the commands of stare decisis very seriously, the problems with Shaw and its
progeny are themselves very serious. The Court has been unable to provide workable standards, the chronic
uncertainty has begotten no discernible reliance, and the costs of persisting doubt about the limits of state
discretion and state responsibility are high.
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... CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here for a second time. In Shaw v. Reno (Shaw 1), we held that plaintiffs whose complaint
alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate and bizarre-looking districts on the basis of race
stated a claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We remanded the
case for further consideration by the District Court. That court held that the North Carolina redistricting plan
did classify voters by race, but that the classification survived strict scrutiny and therefore did not offend the
Constitution. We now hold that the North Carolina plan does violate the Equal Protection Clause because
the State's reapportionment scheme is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest....
Five North Carolinians commenced the present action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina against various state officials. Following our reversal of the District Court's
dismissal of their complaint in Shaw I, the District Court allowed a number of individuals to intervene, 11
on behalf of the plaintiffs and 22 for the defendants. After a 6-day trial, the District Court unanimously found
"that the Plan's lines were deliberately drawn to produce one or more districts of a certain racial
composition." A majority of the court held that the plan was constitutional, nonetheless, because it was
narrowly tailored to further the State's compelling interests in complying with §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c. The dissenting judge disagreed with that portion of the judgment.
We noted probable jurisdiction....
We explained in Miller v. Johnson that a racially gerrymandered districting scheme, like all laws that
classify citizens on the basis of race, is constitutionally suspect. This is true whether or not the reason for the
racial classification is benign or the purpose remedial. Applying traditional equal protection principles in
the voting-rights context is "a most delicate task," Miller, however, because a legislature may be conscious
ofthe voters' races without using race as a basis for assigning voters to districts. The constitutional wrong
occurs when race becomes the "dominant and controlling" consideration.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the race-based motive and may do so either through
"circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics" or through "more direct evidence going to
legislative purpose." After a detailed account of the process that led to enactment of the challenged plan, the
District Court found that the General Assembly of North Carolina "deliberately drew" District 12 so that it
would have an effective voting majority of black citizens.
Appellees urge upon us their view that this finding is not phrased in the same language that we used in
our opinion in Miller v. Johnsonwhere we said that a plaintiff must show "that race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district."
The District Court, of course, did not have the benefit of our opinion in Miller at the time it wrote its
opinion. While it would have been preferable for the court to have analyzed the case in terms of the standard
laid down in Miller, that was not possible. This circumstance has no consequence here because we think that
the District Court's findings, read in the light of the evidence that it had before it, comport with the Miller
standard.
First, the District Court had evidence of the district's shape and demographics. The court observed "the
obvious fact" that the district's shape is "highly irregular and geographically non-compact by any objective
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standard that can be conceived." In fact, the serpentine district has been dubbed the least geographically
compact district in the Nation.
The District Court also had direct evidence of the legislature's objective. The State's submission for
preclearance expressly acknowledged that the Chapter Ts "overriding purpose was to comply with the
dictates of the Attorney General's December 18, 1991 letter and to create two congressional districts with
effective black voting majorities." This admission was confirmed by Gerry Cohen, the plan's principal
draftsman, who testified that creating two majority-black districts was the "principal reason" for Districts
1 and 12. Indeed, appellees in their first appearance before the District Court "formally conceded that the
state legislature deliberately created the two districts in a way to assure black-vote majorities," Shaw v. Barr,
and that concession again was credited by the District Court on remand. Here, as in Miller, "we fail to see
how the District Court could have reached any conclusion other than that race was the predominant factor
in drawing [the challenged district]."
Inhis dissent, JUSTICE STEVENS argues that strict scrutiny does not apply where a State "respects"
or "complies with traditional districting principles." That, however, is not the standard announced and
applied in Miller,where we held that strict scrutiny applies when race is the "predominant" consideration in
drawing the district lines such that "the legislature subordinates race-neutral districting principles . .. to racial
considerations." The Miller standard is quite different from the one that JUSTICE STEVENS advances, as
an examination of the dissent's reasoning demonstrates. The dissent explains that "two race-neutral,
traditional districting criteria" were at work in determining the shape and placement of District 12, and from
this suggests that strict scrutiny should not apply. We do not quarrel with the dissent's claims that, in shaping
District 12, the State effectuated its interest in creating one rural and one urban district, and that partisan
politicking was actively at work in the districting process. That the legislature addressed these interests does
not in any way refute the fact that race was the legislature's predominant consideration. Race was the criterion
that, in the State's view, could not be compromised; respecting communities of interest and protecting
Democratic incumbents came into play only after the race-based decision had been made.
Racial classifications are antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment, whose "central purpose" was "to
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States." While appreciating that a
racial classification causes "fundamental injury" to the "individual rights of a person," we have recognized
that, under certain circumstances, drawing racial distinctions is permissible where a governmental body is
pursuing a "compelling state interest." A State, however, is constrained in how it may pursue that end: "The
means chosen to accomplish the State's asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to
accomplish that purpose." North Carolina, therefore, must show not only that its redistricting plan was in
pursuit of a compelling state interest, but also that "its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve
[that] compelling interest."
Appellees point to three separate compelling interests to sustain District 12: to eradicate the effects of
past and present discrimination; to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and to comply with § 2 of that
Act. We address each in turn.
A State's interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination may in the proper case
justify a government's use of racial distinctions. For that interest to rise to the level of a compelling state
interest, it must satisfy two conditions. First, the discrimination must be "'identified discrimination' ".. . .
A generalized assertion of past discrimination in a particular industry or region is not adequate.. . Second,
the institution that makes the racial distinction must have had a "strong basis in evidence" to conclude that
remedial action was necessary, "before it embarks on an affirmative-action program."
In this case, the District Court found that an interest in ameliorating past discrimination did not actually
precipitate the use of race in the redistricting plan. While some legislators invoked the State's history of
discrimination as an argument for creating a second majority-black district, the court found that these
members did not have enough voting power to have caused the creation of the second district on that basis
alone.
Appellees, to support their claim that the plan was drawn to remedy past discrimination, rely on passages
from two reports prepared for this litigation by an historian and a social scientist. Obviously these reports,
both dated March 1994, were not before the General Assembly when it enacted Chapter 7. And there is little
to suggest that the legislature considered the historical events and social-science data that the reports recount,
beyond what individual members may have recalled from personal experience. We certainly cannot say on
the basis of these reports that the District Court's findings on this point were clearly erroneous.
Appellees devote most of their efforts to arguing that the race-based redistricting was constitutionally
justified by the State's duty to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The District Court agreed and held that
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compliance with §§ 2 and 5 of the Act could be, and in this case was, a compelling state interest. In Miller,
we expressly left open the question whether under the proper circumstances compliance with the Voting
Rights Act, on its own, could be a compelling interest. Here once again we do not reach that question
because we find that creating an additional majority-black district was not required under a correct reading
of § 5 and that District 12, as drawn, is not a remedy narrowly tailored to the State's professed interest in
avoiding § 2 liability.
With respect to §5 of the Voting Rights Act, we believe our decision in Miller forecloses the argument,
adopted by the District Court, that failure to engage in the race-based districting would have violated that
section. In Miller,we considered an equal protection challenge to Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District.
As appellees do here, Georgia contended that its redistricting plan was necessary to meet the Justice
Department's preclearance demands. The Justice Department had interposed an objection to a prior plan that
created only two majority-minority districts. We held that the challenged congressional plan was not required
by a correct reading of § 5 and therefore compliance with that law could not justify race-based districting.
We believe the same conclusion must be drawn here. North Carolina's first plan, Chapter 601,
indisputably was ameliorative, having created the first majority-black district in recent history. Thus, that
plan, "'even if [it] falls short of what might be accomplished in terms of increasing minority representation,"'
'cannot violate §5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to
violate the Constitution."'
As in Miller, the United States relies on the purpose prong of § 5 to explain the Department's
preclearance objections, alleging that North Carolina, for pretextual reasons, did not create a second
majority-minority district We again find the Government's position "insupportable." The General Assembly,
in its submission filed with Chapter 601, explained why it did not create a second minority district; among
its goals were "to keep precincts whole, to avoid dividing counties into more than two districts, and to give
black voters a fair amount of influence by creating at least one district that was majority black in voter
registration and by creating a substantial number of other districts in which black voters would exercise a
significant influence over the choice of congressmen." The submission also explained in detail the
disadvantages of other proposed plans. A memorandum, sent to the Department of Justice on behalf of the
legislators in charge of the redistricting process, provided still further reasons for the State's decision not to
draw two minority districts as urged by various interested parties. We have recognized that a "State's policy
of adhering to other districting principles instead of creating as many majority-minority districts as possible
does not support an inference that the plan 'so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution,' and thus cannot provide any basis under § 5 for the Justice Department's objection."
It appears that the Justice Department was pursuing in North Carolina the same policy of maximizing
the number of majority-black districts that it pursued in Georgia. The two States underwent the preclearance
processes during the same time period and the objection letters they received from the Civil Rights Division
were substantially alike.. .. We explained in Miller that this maximization policy is not properly grounded
in .§5 and the Departments authority thereunder....
With respect to § 2, appellees contend, and the District Court found, that failure to enact a plan with a
second majority-black district would have left the State vulnerable to a lawsuit under this section. Our
precedent establishes that a plaintiff may allege a § 2 violation in a single-member district if the
manipulation of districting lines fragments politically cohesive minority voters among several districts or
packs them into one district or a small number of districts, and thereby dilutes the voting strength of members
of the minority population. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove that the minority group "is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district"; that the
minority group "is politically cohesive"; and that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable
it . .. usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." A court must also consider all other relevant
circumstances and must ultimately find based on the totality of those circumstances that members of a
protected class "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice". . . .
We find this position singularly unpersuasive. We do not see how a district so drawn would avoid § 2
liability. If a §2 violation is proven for a particular area, it flows from the fact that individuals in this area
"have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate inthe political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). The vote dilution injuries suffered by these persons
are not remedied by creating a safe majority-black district somewhere else in the State. For example, if a
geographically compact, cohesive minority population lives in south-central to southeastern North Carolina,
as the Justice Department's objection letter suggested, District 12 which spans the Piedmont Crescent would
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not address that § 2 violation. The black voters of the south-central to southeastern region would still be
suffering precisely the same injury that they suffered before District 12 was drawn. District 12 would not
address the professed interest of relieving the vote dilution, much less be narrowly tailored to accomplish the
goal.
Arguing, as appellees do and the District Court did, that the State may draw the district anywhere derives
from a misconception of the vote-dilution claim. To accept that the district may be placed anywhere implies
that the claim, and hence the coordinate right to an undiluted vote (to cast a ballot equal among voters),
belongs to the minority as a group and not to its individual members. It does not.
The United States submits that District 12 does, in fact, incorporate a "substantial portion" of the
concentration of minority voters that would have given rise to a §2 claim. Specifically, the Government
claims that "District 12 .. . contains the heavy concentration of African Americans in Mecklenburg County,
the same urban component included in the second minority opportunity district in some of the alternative
plans." The portion of District 12 that lies in Mecklenburg County covers not more than 20% of the district.
We do not think that this degree of incorporation could mean that District 12 substantially addresses the §
2 violation. We hold, therefore, that District 12 is not narrowly tailored to the State's asserted interest in
complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is Reversed.
... JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER join as to Parts II-V,
dissenting.
As I have explained on prior occasions, I am convinced that the Court's aggressive supervision of state
action designed to accommodate the political concerns of historically disadvantaged minority groups is
seriously misguided. A majoritys attempt to enable the minority to participate more effectively in the process
of democratic government should not be viewed with the same hostility that is appropriate for oppressive and
exclusionary abuses of political power. But even if we accept the Court's refusal to recognize any distinction
between two vastly different kinds of situations, we should affirm the judgment of the District Court in this
case....
The District Court concluded that Shaw Irequired the application of strict scrutiny in any case containing
proof that "racial considerations played a 'substantial' or 'motivating' role in the line-drawing process, even
if they were not the only factor that influenced that process." The court acknowledged that under this standard
any deliberate effort to draw majority-minority districts in conformity with the Voting Rights Act would
attract the strictest constitutional review, regardless of whether race-neutral districting criteria were also
considered. As a consequence, it applied strict scrutiny in this case solely on the basis of North Carolina's
concession that it sought to draw two majority-minority districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights
Act, and without performing any inquiry into whether North Carolina had considered race-neutral districting
criteria in drawing District 12's boundaries....

...
The evidence of shape and intent relied on by the majority cannot overcome the basic fact that North
Carolina did not have to draw Districts 1 and 12 in order to comply with the Justice Department's finding that
federal law required the creation of two majority-minority districts. That goal could have been more
straightforwardly accomplished by simply adopting the Attorney General's recommendation to draw a
geographically compact district in the southeastern portion of the State in addition to the majority-minority
district that had already been drawn in the northeastern and Piedmont regions.
That the legislature chose to draw Districts I and 12 instead surely suggests that something more than
the desire to create a majority-minority district took precedence....
Here, no evidence suggests that race played any role in the legislature's decision to choose the winding
contours of District 12 over the more cartographically pleasant boundaries proposed by the Attorney General.
Rather, the record reveals that two race-neutral, traditional districting criteria determined District 12's shape:
the interest in ensuring that incumbents would remain residents of the districts they have previously
represented; and the interest in placing predominantly rural voters in one district and predominantly urban
voters in another.

...

If race rather than incumbency protection had been the dominant consideration, it seems highly unlikely
that the Democrats would have drawn this bizarre district rather than accepting more compact options that
were clearly available. If race, rather than politics, had been the "predominant" consideration for the
Democrats, they could have accepted the Republican Plan, thereby satisfying the Attorney General and
avoiding any significant risk of liability as well as the attack mounted by the plaintiffs in this case. Instead,
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as the detailed findings of the District Court demonstrate, the legislature deliberately crafted a districting plan
that would accommodate the needs of Democratic incumbents....
A deliberate effort to consolidate urban voters in one district and rural voters in another also explains
District 12's highly irregular shape. . .[T]he legislature was naturally attracted to a plan that, although less
than aesthetically pleasing, included both District 12, which links the State's major urban centers, and District
1, which has a population that predominantly lives in cities with populations of less than 20,000.
Moreover, the record reveals that District 12's lines were drawn in order to unite an African-American
community whose political tradition was quite distinct from the one that defines African-American voters
in the Coastal Plain, which District I surrounds. Indeed, two other majority-minority-district plans with less
torturous boundaries were thought unsatisfactory precisely because they did not unite communities of
interest....
In light of the majority's decision not to remand for proper application of the Miller test, I do not
understand how it can condemn the drawing of District 12 given these two race-neutral justifications for its
shape. To be sure, in choosing a district that snakes rather than sits, North Carolina did not put a premium
on geographical compactness. But I do not understand why that should matter in light of the evidence which
shows that other race-neutral districting considerations were determinative.

I

.The majority's analysis of the "compelling interest" issue nicely demonstrates the problem with
parsing legislative motive in this context. The majority posits that the legislature's compelling interest in
drawing District 12 was its desire to avoid liability under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Yet it addresses the
question whether North Carolina had a compelling interest only because it first concludes that a racial
purpose dominated the State's districting effort.
It seems to me that if the State's true purpose were to serve its compelling interest in staving off costly
litigation by complying with federal law, then it cannot be correct to say that a racially discriminatory purpose
controlled its line-drawing. A more accurate conclusion would be that the State took race into account only
to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of a carefully thought out federal statute....
However, even if I were to assume that strict scrutiny applies, and thus that it makes sense to consider
the question, I would not share the majority's hesitancy in concluding that North Carolina had a "compelling
interest" in drawing District 12. In my view, the record identifies not merely one, but at least three acceptable
reasons that may have motivated legislators to favor the creation of two such districts....
First, some legislators felt that the sorry history of race relations in North Carolina in past decades was
a sufficient reason for making it easier for more black leaders to participate in the legislative process and to
represent the State in the Congress of the United States. Even if that history does not provide the kind of
precise guidance that will justify certain specific affirmative action programs in particular industries, it surely
provides an adequate basis for a decision to facilitate the election of representatives of the previously
disadvantaged minority....
Second, regardless of whether § 5 of the Act was actually violated, I believe the State's interest in
avoiding the litigation that would have been necessary to overcome the Attorney General's objection to the
original plan provides an acceptable reason for creating a second majority-minority district....
The District Court here found as a factual matter that the legislature's independent assessment of the
reasons for the Attorney General's denial of preclearance led it to the reasonable conclusion that its 11-white
district plan would violate the purpose prong of § 5.... I do not accept the Court's conclusion that it was
unreasonable for the State to believe that its decision to draw I majority-minority district out of 12 would
have been subject to a successful attack under the purpose prong of § 5.
Third, regardless of the possible outcome of litigation alleging that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act would
be violated by a plan that ensured the election of white legislators in 11 of the State's 12 congressional
districts, the interest in avoiding the expense and unpleasantness of such litigation was certainly legitimate
and substantial. That the legislature reasonably feared the possibility of a successful § 2 challenge cannot
be credibly denied.
Inthe course of the redistricting debate, numerous maps had been presented showing that blacks could
constitute more than 50 percent of the population in two districts. The District Court found that these plans
had demonstrated that "the state's African-American population was sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in two congressional districts."
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Moreover, the Attorney General denied preclearance on the ground that North Carolina could have
created a second majority-minority district that was, under any reasonable standard, geographically compact.
Maps prepared by the plaintiff-intervenors for this litigation conclusively demonstrate that two compact,
majority-minority districts could indeed have been drawn.
Even if many of the maps proposing two majority-African-American districts were not particularly
compact, the legislature reasonably concluded that a federal court might have determined that some of them
could have provided the basis for a viable vote dilution suit pursuant to Thornburg v. Gingles. That
conclusion is particularly reasonable in light of the fact that Gingles was a case fresh in the minds of many
of North Carolina's state legislators. There, the State challenged the plaintiffs' §2 claim by pointing to the
oddly configured lines that defined their proposed majority-minority districts. As we know, North Carolina's
defense to § 2 liability proved unsuccessful in that instance, even though the district court acknowledged that
the "single-member district specifically suggested by the plaintiffs as a viable one is obviously not a model
of aesthetic tidiness."
Finally, even if the record shows that African-American voters would not have comprised more than 50
percent of the population in any plan containing two compact, majority-minority districts, the record reveals
that it would have been possible to have drawn a map containing one compact district in which
African-Americans would have comprised more than 50 percent of the population and another compact
district in which African-Americans, by reason of the large presence of Native Americans, would have by
far constituted the largest racial group. Given our recent emphasis on considering the totality of the
circumstances in § 2 cases, we are in no position to rebuke a State for concluding that a 40-plus percent
African-American district could provide a defense to a viable Gingles challenge as surely as could one with
a 50.1 percent African-American population.
IV

Although the Court assumes that North Carolina had a compelling interest in "avoiding liability" under
§ 2, it avoids conclusively resolving that question because it holds that District 12 was not a "narrowly
tailored" means of achieving that end. The majority reaches this conclusion by determining that District 12
did not "remedy" any potential violation of § 2 that may have occurred.
In my judgment, if a State's new plan successfully avoids the potential litigation entirely, there is no
reason why it must also take the form of a "remedy" for an unproven violation. Thus, the fact that no § 2
violation has been proven in the territory that comprises District 12 does not show that the district fails to
serve a compelling state interest It shows only that a federal court, which is constrained by Article Ill, would
not have had the power to require North Carolina to draw that district. It is axiomatic that a State should have
more authority to institute a districting plan than would a federal court.
That District 12 will protect North Carolina from liability seems clear. The record gives no indication
that any of the potential § 2 claimants is interested in challenging the plan that contains District 12.
Moreover, as a legal matter, North Carolina is in a stronger position to defend against a § 2 lawsuit with
District 12 than without it.
In addition, satisfaction of the so-called Gingles preconditions does not entitle an individual minority
voter to inclusion in a majority-minority district A court may conclude that a State must create such a district
only after it considers the totality of the circumstances. A court would be remiss if it failed to take into
account that the State had drawn majority-minority districts proportional to its minority population which
include portions of the very minority community in which an individual minority plaintiff resides. Indeed,
our recent decisions compel courts to perform just such a calculus.
Finally, North Carolina's chosen means of avoiding liability will impose none of the burdens on third
parties that have made the Court wary of voluntary, race-based state action in the past. At most, North
Carolina's chosen means will require that some people of both races will be placed in districts other than
those to which they would have otherwise been assigned. Even assuming that "burden" is more onerous when
it results from racial considerations, it does not rise to a level of injury that justifies a federal court intruding
on the State's discretion to formulate a plan that complies with the Voting Rights Act.
In fact, to the extent that plaintiffs in these cases premise their standing on the "representational" harms
that they suffer, a State's decision to locate a majority-minority district outside the area that suffers from
acute, racial bloc voting would seem to diminish the likelihood that representatives in majority-minority
districts will serve only the interests of minority voters. After all, a representative of a majority-minority
district that does not suffer from racial bloc voting cannot safely ignore the interests of voters of either race.
In this respect, the majority's narrow tailoring requirement, by forcing States to remedy perceived § 2
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violations only by drawing the district around the area in which the Gingles preconditions have been
satisfied, has the perverse consequence of requiring States to inflict the very harm that supposedly renders
racial gerrymandering challenges constitutionally cognizable.
Although I do not believe a judicial inquiry into "narrow tailoring" is either necessary or appropriate in
this case, the foregoing discussion reveals that the "narrow tailoring" requirement that the Court has
fashioned is a pure judicial invention that unfairly deprives the legislature of a sovereign state of its
traditional discretion in determining the boundaries of its electoral districts. The Court's analysis gives rise
to the unfortunate suggestion that a State which fears a § 2 lawsuit must draw the precise district that it
believes a federal court would have the power to impose. Such a proposition confounds basic principles of
federalism, and forces States to imagine the legally "correct" outcome of a lawsuit that has not even been
filed.
Mhe Court today rejects North Carolina's plan because it does not provide the precise remedy that might
have been ordered by a federal court, even though it satisfies potential plaintiffs, furthers such race-neutral
legislative ends as incumbency protection and the preservation of distinct communities of interest, and
essentially serves to insulate the State from a successful statutory challenge. There is no small irony in the
fact that the Court's decision to intrude into the State's districting process comes in response to a lawsuit
brought on behalf of white voters who have suffered no history of exclusion from North Carolina's political
process, and whose only claims of harm are at best rooted in speculative and stereotypical assumptions about
the kind of representation they are likely to receive from the candidates that their neighbors have chosen. ...
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER join,
dissenting. [OMITTED]
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95-1455 RENO v. BOSSIER PARISH, LA.,
SCHOOL BOARD
Voting Rights Act-Discriminatory purpose.
Ruling below (DC DC, 907 F.Supp. 434):
Political subdivision that does not violate either
"effect" or "purpose" prong of Section 5 of Voting Rights Act, which requires proof that proposed electoral change does not have purpose and
will not have effect of denying or abridging right
to vote on account of race in order to obtain
preclearance thereunder, may not be denied preclearance under Section 5 on basis of alleged
violation of VRA's Section 2, which permits challenge of "voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting or standard, practice, or procedure" in any
political subdivision when it "results in a denial
or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or
color"; nor may evidence of Section 2 violation be
considered as evidence of discriminatory purpose
under Section 5; Louisiana parish school board,
composed of 12 members elected from singlemember districts, that adopted plan used to redistrict parish police jury, which is also composed of
12 members elected from single-member districts,
established prima facie case for Section 5 preclearance, because police jury plan had already
been precleared by U.S. attorney general and,
because no precinct lines needed to be redrawn,
was easy to implement; evidence did not indicate
that school board was aware of possibility that
police jury plan had been precleared only because
relevant information had been withheld from attorney general; alleged statements by school
board members that other board members were
"hostile to black representation" and hostile to
drawing majority-black districts is insufficient to
indicate that school board acted with discriminatory purpose in adopting police jury plan, and
another board member's alleged statement that
he would not let his seat be taken also fails to
show that board acted with discriminatory motivation; nor does indirect evidence, based upon
sequence of events leading to school board's adoption of police jury plan, raise inference that plan
was adopted with discriminatory purpose; adoption of one non-retrogressive plan containing no
majority-black districts rather than another plan,
also non-retrogressive, that contains two majorityblack districts does not by itself give rise to
inference of discriminatory purpose.
Questions presented: (1) May district court
assessing covered jurisdiction's purpose under
Section 5 of 1965 Voting Rights Act, 42 USC
1973c, disregard factors this court has held are
relevant to proof of discriminatory purpose on
ground that such evidence is also relevant to show
vote dilution under Section 2, 42 USC 1973? (2)
Did district court clearly err in finding no discriminatory purpose on basis of factors it considered in this case? (3) Is voting change that
clearly violates Section 2 of Voting Rights Act
entitled to preclearance under Section 5 of
statute?
Appeal filed 3/11/96, by Drew S. Days III,
Sol. Gen., Deval L. Patrick, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Paul Bender, Dpty. Sol Gen., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Asst. to Sol. Gen., and David K. Flynn and
Eileen Penner, Justice Dept. attys.
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BLACK VOTERS CHALLENGE DISTRICTS
NAACP Says Election Set-Up
The Times-Picayune
Sunday, July 21, 1996
John McQuaid, Washington Bureau
The Bossier Parish School Board held a historic
election in 1995. Voters elected two black
candidates to the previously all-white board. Even
more unusual, they were elected from districts with
majorities ofwhite voters - a rarity, especially in the
South.
But instead of congratulating the victors,
lawyers with the U.S. Justice Department and the
local branch of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, both dedicated to
expanding political opportunities for minorities,
cried foul.
In a case now before the Supreme Court, they
are trying to force the board to redraw its district
lines and create two majority-black districts. To
them, the election results were staged to undercut
their case - if not legally, then in the court of public
opinion.
Without offering evidence, the NAACP and its
lawyers say that the candidacies of the black board
members were set up by the white-dominated
political establishment to avoid the creation of the
black majority districts. Board members deny it.
"We felt like this was a situation that was pretty
well staged," said George Price, the president of the
Bossier Parish NAACP.
The NAACP doesn't usually attack black
candidates, especially successful ones. But these are
contentious times for black candidates and voters in
the South and elsewhere, since the Supreme Court
declared three years ago that drawing
be
might
districts
majority-minority
unconstitutional.
The outcome of the ongoing debate could shape
the face of politics in the South for years to come.
"Racial gerrymandering," as the Court calls it,
is under siege from the local up to the congressional
levels. Black majority congressional districts in
Texas, Georgia, North Carolina and Louisiana have
been rejected by the courts. Two black incumbents
in Georgia won Democratic primaries over white
candidates this month, but still face a general
election. U.S. Rep. Cleo Fields, D-Baton Rouge,
decided not to run for re-election after his district
was redrawn to eliminate its black majority.
The Bossier Parish case, which will be argued
this fall, reflects that siege mentality. The case,
which initially pitted an all-white school board

against black activists seeking representation for the
first time in history, might once have seemed
-clear-cut.
But the Court's decisions have muddied the
waters, highlighting the contradictions on both
sides. Can a system that traditionally has excluded
minorities suddenly become color-blind? Can racism
be eliminated with districts drawn on racial lines?
Politics is the messy art of compromise, not
necessarily a way to justice.
There is the difficulty of proving discrimination
in an era when it has not disappeared, but is often
expressed more subtly. And the election of more
black officials has spurred arguments that the
racially drawn districts are no longer needed.
At the same time, Supreme Court justices have
avoided articulating a standard for how governments
should take race into account. That leaves confusion
on all sides.
"I'm afraid with this ambiguity, we're going to
continue to see a lot of litigation. We have
minorities with claims of discrimination and vote
dilution, and whites with claims that the
goverments went too far," said Richard Engstrom,
a political scientist at the University of New
Orleans. "And it's going to be that way probably
until after the year 2000, when the next round of
redistricting takes place."
Engstrom studies racially polarized voting; he
testified as an expert witness for the Justice
Department in the Bossier case in federal court.
The Bossier case is a perfect example of the
confusion. It deals with a 1992 decision by the
School Board to draw a new district map with no
majority black districts. The dispute hinges on the
question of whether the board's action was racist.
But that question has become a legal swamp of
charges and counter-charges in which the truth is
hard to sort out.
The NAACP's George Price decided to press for
the creation of two black majority districts for what
he said was an obvious reason: There had never
been a black candidate elected to the Bossier Parish
School Board.
Inlegal briefs, Price's attorneys and the Justice
Department cite several reasons why: The parish's
long history of official discrimination - something
that had continued as late at the 1970s and lingered
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beyond. In the schools, where 28 percent of the
students are black, only 8 percent of the teachers are
- something that to him indicated an institutional
lack of interest in attracting and keeping black
teachers.
"Our kids are suffering in the parish school
system," Price said. "We have a high expulsion rate,
a decrease in the number of minority teachers, a
drop ofminorities in supervisory positions. We saw
a lack of interest expressed and lack of sensitivity to
issues we brought up about our kids. We felt that
our kids and parents did not have the representation
to deal with these concerns."
The black population of Bossier Parish is about
17.6 percent of the voting-age population, according
to the 1990 census. With the help of the NAACP's
national Voting Rights Project, Price drew up maps
creating two black majority districts out of 12.
Over a period of several months, he mounted
his campaign, collecting 500 signatures on a petition
supporting black majority districts. Backed by
supporters, he presented the signatures and the
proposed districts to the board during a meeting in
September 1992.
Board members, who had recently appointed
their first black member to fill an unexpired term,
were clearly taken aback by the demands. According
to legal briefs, there was talk that some white board
members didn't want to draw black majority
districts.
Shortly afterward, the board met and voted to
pass a map that already existed: the one used by the
parish Police Jury. It had no black majority districts.
And it had a stamp of approval from the Justice
Department.
Under the Voting Rights Act, voting districts in
Louisiana, nine other states and parts of some others
with histories of racial discrimination must have
their maps approved by the Justice Department.
Rather than become embroiled in conflict which seemed sure to be the outcome whether they
drew two black majority districts or none - board
members say they took the line of least resistance.
"When we learned that Department of Justice
had approved the Police Jury plan, we went with it
without any hesitation," said former board member
Thomas Myrick, who pushed the idea. "It was a gift
to us. Here we've got a plan that was already
pre-cleared."
Cartographer Gary Joiner, who draws voting
districts using computer programs, drew the Police
Jury map and was originally hired by the board to
draw its districts.
Joiner said it would not be easy to create
black-majority districts. With a large portion of the
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black population scattered around the parish, he said
he told the board, it cannot be done without drawing
oddly shaped districts - something the court has
since become skeptical of.
"They were connecting minority populations
with no sense of cohesion," Joiner said of the
NAACP's proposed districts. "In some cases, these
districts were only one census bloc wide. They said,
'OK, that's fine, we're putting black people together
and there's your cohesion.' But that's not what the
Supreme Court says."
But lawyers for the NAACP say that because
districts come in so many shapes and sizes, and
because the Supreme Court has not definitively
decided the question of shape because it's so
subjective, that the issue is something of a red
herring.
The NAACP plans also required splitting
dozens of voting precincts - something that is
against state law. Though it's possible to get a
waiver if the Voting Rights Act is invoked, it had
never been done for more than a few split precincts
at a time. That also made board members reluctant
to proceed.
Nevertheless, Price protested the board's
decision to the Justice Department's civil rights
division, which dispatched lawyers and investigators
to the parish to interview board members and others
involved.
A couple of months later, the Department
rejected the School Board's map - the same map it
had approved for the Police Jury. It demanded board
members adopt a map with two black-majority
districts.
But the board was encouraged by the Supreme
Court's skepticism on race-based redistricting,
expressed for the first time in 1993. It decided to
challenge the rejection in federal court.
The government's case is based on Bossier
Parish's historical disenfranchisement of black
voters and anecdotal - though not explicit - evidence

of racism by the board.
Board members claim they acted out of political
expediency, not racism.
They argue that the federal government decided
to impose two black majority districts with little
evidence of racism, then went on a fishing
expedition to find some.
"From the beginning, Justice Department
personnel along with intervenors (in the suit) were
persuaded that Bossier Parish is a cesspool of racial
bigotry," said a fire-and-brimstone brief filed by
lawyer James Thornton. The federal court hearing
the case found the School Board's arguments more
compelling, voting 2-1 to approve the districts.

The court also said the Justice Department
overstepped its bounds.
In deciding whether to approve districts, the
Justice Department uses Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, which says new maps must have no
discriminatory intent and cannot be retrogressive they must not leave minority voters worse off than
they were before.
But in deciding the Bossier request, the
department cited Section 2 of the Act, which
normally applies to challenges to existing maps.
Section 2 uses broader language than Section 5. In
proving a Section 2 violation, there is no need to
demonstrate the mapmakers intended to
discriminate, just that the map resulted in the "denial
or abridgement" of minority citizens' right to vote.
The federal panel said Justice had improperly
cited this language and misinterpreted the Voting
Rights Act.
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That's the question the Supreme Court agreed to
review. Much is at stake: If the Court upholds that
interpretation, the Justice Department would have to
use a tougher standard to reject maps - meaning it

would be even harder to force governments to draw
majority-minority districts.
Since the lower court decision, the election in
1995 of the two black board members - Julian
Darby and Bassie Richardson - has further muddled

the issues. On its face, it seems to undercut the idea
that you need a black majority district to elect black
candidates.
They vigorously dispute the charges that they
are somehow dupes of people wanting to stop
majority black districts.
"I was encouraged to run by white and black
friends, and I know I had a lot of white supporters,"
said Richardson, 59, a retired teacher who won by
66 votes in the runoff over a white candidate.
The Times-Picayune Copyright 1996

BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BD., Plaintiff,
v.

JANET RENO, Defendant,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
907 F. Supp. 434
November 2, 1995
... Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN,,in which District Judge RICHEY joins.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintf Bossier Parish School Board, seeks preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1973c, for its proposed redistricting. We shall grant the requested preclearance.
I.
Bossier Parish is located in northwestern Louisiana, bordered on the north by Arkansas. As reported by
the 1990 census, Bossier Parish's population is 86,088, of whom 20.1% are black. Blacks constitute 17.6%
of the voting age population of Bossier Parish and 15.5% of its registered voters. Bossier City, the Parish's
most populous city, is located in the central western portion of the Parish and has a population of 52,721,
of whom 17.95% are black. The black population is also concentrated in Benton, Plain Dealing, Haughton,
and in the unincorporated community of Princeton.
Bossier Parish is governed by a Police Jury, the 12 members of which are elected from single-member
districts for consecutive four-year terms. At no time in Parish history have the Police Jury electoral districts
included a district with a majority of black voters. Since 1983, however, a black police juror, Jerome Darby,
has been elected three times from a majority-white district, the last time unopposed.
The Police Jury undertook to redraw its electoral districts because of population shifts, as reflected in
the 1980 census, that resulted in widely divergent populations among the existing districts. In November
1990, the Police Jury hired a cartographer, Gary Joiner, to assist in the process. At a public hearing on the
Police Jury redistricting, black residents inquired about the possibility of creating majority-black districts,
and were told that the black population of Bossier Parish was too far-flung to create any such district. On
April 30, 1991, the Police Jury unanimously adopted one of the plans prepared by their cartographer as the
final plan. The plan served the police jurors' incumbency concerns, and roughly provided for an even
distribution of population among the districts. That same day, Concerned Citizens, a group of black residents
of Bossier Parish, submitted a letter to the Police Jury complaining about the manner in which the
redistricting plan was prepared and adopted. The plan was forwarded to the Attorney General on May 28,
1991, and, on July 29, 1991, the Attorney General precleared it. On January 11, 1994, the Police Jury
unanimously voted to maintain the redistricting plan precleared by the Attorney General.
The Bossier Parish School Board is constituted much like the Police Jury. The School Board has 12
members elected from single-member districts to consecutive four-year terms. Both the Police Jury and
School Board electoral districts have majority voting requirements: a candidate must receive a majority of
the votes cast, not merely a plurality, to win an election. In the School Board's history, no black candidate
has been elected to membership on the Board, though one black School Board member was appointed to a
vacant seat in 1992.
The Board, like the Police Jury, was also required to redraw its districts after the 1990 census. In fact,
members of the Board had approached the Police Jury about the prospect ofjointly redistricting, but were
rebuffed by police jurors with incumbency concerns divergent from those of the School Board members. The
next scheduled election for the School Board was not until November 1994, and the School Board did not
undertake the task of redistricting with particular urgency. In May 1991, the Board hired the same
cartographer who had assisted the Police Jury with its redistricting, Gary Joiner. When he was hired, Joiner
informed the Board that one readily available option was the Police Jury plan which had already been
precleared by the Attorney General and which, if adopted by the Board, was sure to be precleared again....
At a Board meeting in September 1991, Board member Thomas Myrick suggested that the Board adopt
the Police Jury plan. Myrick had participated in a number of meetings with Joiner and police jurors during
their redistricting. No action was taken on Myrick's proposal.
On March 25, 1992, George Price, president of the local chapter of the NAACP and a
defendant-intervenor in this case, wrote to the Board to express the NAACP's desire to be involved in every
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aspect of the redistricting process. Price received no response to his letter and, on August 17, 1992, wrote
again, this time to say that the NAACP would dispute any plan that did not provide for majority-black
districts. At an August 20, 1992 meeting of the School Board, Price presented a number of proposals
concerning the management ofthe school district to the School Board, including the appointment of a black
to fill the vacancy on the Board created by a Board member's departure. Sometime during August 1992,
Board members met individually with Joiner to review different options for redistricting.
During the summer of 1992, the NAACP Redistricting Project in Baltimore, Maryland prepared a
redistricting plan for the School Board that included two majority-black districts. Price presented the results
of these efforts, a partial plan demonstrating the possibility of two majority-black districts, to a School Board
official. Price was told that the School Board would not consider a plan that did not set forth all 12 districts.
Price brought just such a plan to the September 3, 1992 meeting of the School Board. At that meeting, both
Joiner and Bossier Parish District Attorney, James Buller, dismissed the NAACP plan because the plan
required splitting a number of voting precincts.
Under Louisiana law, school board districts must contain whole voting precincts (i.e., they may not split
voting precincts). While there has been dispute over the matter, the parties have stipulated that school boards
redistricting around the time the Bossier Parish School Board was redistricting were "free to request precinct
changes from the Police Jury necessary to accomplish their redistricting plans." Defendant-intervenors'
witness, David Creed, testified that he himself had routinely drawn redistricting plans that split precincts. The
largest number ofprecincts that Creed had ever split was eight--far fewer than the 46 precinct splits resulting
under the NAACP plan that was presented to the Board or any other plan proffered since by defendant or
defendant-intervenors. In any event, the School Board never approached the Police Jury to request precinct
changes.
On September 10, 1992, the School Board interviewed candidates for the one vacant seat on the School
Board. By a six-to-five vote, the School Board appointed the only black candidate, Jerome Blunt.
Defendant-Intervenors contend that this appointment came despite "bitter opposition from white voters."
On September 17, 1992, Blunt was swom in as a Board member. His term in office lasted six months, ending
in a special-election defeat to a white candidate. The vacant seat to which Blunt was appointed represented
a district with the population that was 11% black.
At the same meeting during which Blunt took the oath of office, the School Board passed a motion of
intent to adopt the Police Jury plan. The School Board announced that a public meeting would be held on
September 24, 1992, with final action to be taken on the plan on October 1, 1992.
At the September 24, 1992 meeting, the School Board meeting room was filled to overflowing. Price
presented the Board with a petition signed by more than 500 residents of the Parish asking that the Board
consider alternative redistricting plans. Additionally, a number of black residents addressed the Board to
express their opposition to the proposed Police Jury plan. No one spoke in support of the plan. On October
1, 1992, the School Board unanimously adopted the Police Jury plan. Although he had taken office in time
to vote on the plan, Jerome Blunt abstained. One other School Board member, Barbara W. Gray, was absent
and did not vote.
The plan adopted by the School Board pits two pairs of incumbents against each other, leaving two
districts with no incumbents. The plan does not distribute the school district's schools evenly among the
electoral districts: some have several schools, others have none.
On January 4, 1993, the School Board submitted its proposed redistricting plan to the Attorney General.
On March 5, 1993, the Attorney General requested more information on the redistricting plan, which the
School Board provided. On August 30, 1993, the Attorney General interposed a formal objection to the
School Board's plan. The Attorney General's letter indicated that, while the identical Police Jury plan had
been precleared, the Attorney General objected on the basis of "new information." The Attorney General
noted that an alternative plan which showed "that black residents are sufficiently numerous and
geographically compact so as to constitute a majority in two single-member districts" and which was
preferred by members of the black community had been presented to and rejected by the School Board. The
Attorney General further cited the School Board's failure to "accommodate the requests of the black
community."
The Attorney General's objection letter stated that, while the School Board was not required to "adopt
any particular plan, it is not free to adopt a plan that unnecessarily limits the opportunity for minority voters
to elect their candidates of choice." The Attorney General rejected the School Board's argument that the
Louisiana statute concerning splitting precincts was sufficient reason not to create majority-black districts.
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On September 3, 1993, the School Board unanimously voted to seek reconsideration of the objection
from the Attorney General. On December 20, 1993, the Attorney General denied the Board's request for
reconsideration. The School Board filed this action on July 8, 1994. On April 10 and 11, 1995, this matter
was tried before a single judge of this panel, pursuant to an agreement of the parties. The record of those
proceedings has been provided to the other two judges on the panel and closing argument was conducted
before the entire panel on July 27, 1995.
In the course of this litigation, defendant-intervenors have prepared two more plans that provide for two
majority-black districts. Both plans were prepared by defendant-intervenor's witness, William Cooper. The
first plan (Cooper I) provides for one majority-black district in the northwestern corner of the parish and one
in Bossier City. The second plan (Cooper II)is not materially different. Neither of these plans was before the
School Board when it adopted the Police July plan.
II.
For a political subdivision subject to section 5 to obtain preclearance of a voting change, it must prove
that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color." All parties agree that the "effect" prong of section 5 requires a
showing of retrogression. And, all parties agree that the School Board's proposed redistricting will not have
a retrogressive effect. The case, then, turns on whether plaintiff can by a preponderance of the evidence
demonstrate that the redistricting plan was enacted without discriminatory purpose.
...The School Board adopted the Police Jury plan because it had been precleared by the Attorney
General and would provide an easy way to avoid the controversy that increasingly surrounded the
redistricting process. Further, the Police Jury plan required that no precincts be split, avoiding the difficulty
and expense that would have accompanied any other plan, and particularly the only other plan the School
Board had seen: the NAACP plan. The School Board have throughout the litigation proffered a series of
other purposes said to have motivated the decision to adopt the Police Jury plan. Among these were a desire
to adhere to traditional districting principles and to avoid racial gerrymandering.
...
Defendant argues that we should deny preclearance because the School Board's redistricting plan
violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. If we conclude that we may not engage in the section 2 inquiry
in this section 5 case, defendant contends that we may nonetheless consider the School Board's violation of
section 2 as evidence of its discriminatory purpose. Defendant and defendant-intervenors further argue that
we should deny preclearance based on "direct" and "indirect" evidence that the School Board acted with a
discriminatory purpose.
A.
Defendant and defendant-intervenors maintain that preclearance must be denied if the School Board's
plan runs afoul of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. We hold, as has every court that has considered the
question, that a political subdivision that does not violate either the "effect" or the "purpose" prong of
section 5 cannot be denied preclearance because of an alleged section 2 violation.
...
Defendant contends that the statutory language of section 2 and section 5 are in significant part so
indistinguishable as to require the importation of section 2 into section 5. It is also argued that the legislative
history of section 2 makes clear that Congress, in amending section 2, intended that voting practices be
denied section 5 preclearance where those voting practices violate section 2. Defendant finally contends that
this court should defer to defendant's own regulations, which interpret section 5 as requiring denial of
preclearance where a proposed change violates section 2.
Defendant has presented many, if not all, of these arguments to other courts and to other panels of this
court without any success. Defendant acknowledges these prior cases, but claims that they are distinguishable
from the one before us. We, like our predecessors, reject defendant's latest--and by now rather
shopworn--effort to squeeze section 2 into section 5.
We are unconvinced by defendant's casual effort to equate the standards of section 2 and section 5. In
its brief defendant asserts that "there is no meaningful distinction between the plain meaning of the term
[sic] 'effect' and !result.' To reach this facile conclusion, one must willfully blind oneself to the fact that the
term "results" in subsection (a) of section 2 is defined by reference to the language set forth in subsection (b)
of section 2. None of the language that modifies "results"in section 2 appears in section 5.
Not only are the two sections drafted with different language, even a cursory review of the case law
applying the two statutory sections as written and as applied over the years makes clear that the two sections
serve very different functions.
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Section 5 ofthe Voting Rights Act establishes an extraordinary procedure in our federal system. Before
a "covered jurisdiction"--i.e., a State or one of its political subdivisions which is subject to section 5--may
change a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting," it must have the change precleared by either this court or the Attorney General. Preclearance in this
court comes in the form of "a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in .. . this title."
The Supreme Court has read the "effect" prong of section 5 to require that "no voting-procedure changes
would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." This "nonretrogression" interpretation has repeatedly been
reasserted by the Supreme Court, most recently in Miller v. Johnson.
This formulation relates directly to section 5's function. Section 5 was enacted in response to the efforts
of jurisdictions to avoid compliance with the Voting Rights Act by adopting new, violative schemes as
quickly as the old ones could be struck down. "'By freezing election procedures in the covered areas unless
the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory,' section 5 ensures that a plaintiff seeking to challenge an
existing voting scheme in federal court under section 2 will have a stationary target to attack."
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act uses plainly different language and serves a different function from
that of section 5. Under section 2, a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure" in any political subdivision (not just a covered jurisdiction) may be challenged where it "results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color."
Subsection (b) of section 2 provides that a voting procedure has the prohibited result where based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. Subsection (b) contains a
different standard from the retrogression standard found by the Supreme Court in section 5; as courts have
since recognized, section 2 can be violated without any discriminatory purpose and irrespective of whether
the disputed voting practice is better or worse than whatever it is meant to replace. Sections 2 and 5 are
substantially different, both on their face and in the manner in which they have been interpreted and applied.
Moreover, the two sections differ as to the allocation of the burden of proof. In an action under section
5, the burden ofproof is on the political subdivision seeking to enact a voting change. In a section 2 action,
on the other hand, the burden of proof is on the party challenging a voting practice. That crucial procedural
difference strongly suggests the inappropriateness of importing section 2 standards into section 5.
. Where the language of a statutory regime is unambiguous, as it is here, we need not resort to that
regime's legislative history. Even if the language of sections 2 and 5 did not plainly contemplate two different
and independent inquiries, we would not be persuaded that what little legislative history defendant has
discovered is sufficient to justify the radical expansion of an already significant encroachment on the
prerogatives of States and their subdivisions. . . argument--that an additional reason for the court to import
section 2 into section 5 is that the Department of Justice has promulgated regulations stating that
preclearance under section 5 ought to be denied where the proposed voting change violates section 2....
Wherever else the Attorney General's interpretation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act may be entitled to
deference, it certainly is not in this court. We will not defer to the Attorney General where, under the statute,
an action seeking preclearance may be brought here in the first instance.
As we have noted, all courts to have considered the question have decided that section 2 may not be
imported in section 5. Defendant would distinguish these cases, insisting that the other panels refused to
import section 2 into section 5 cases because the only alleged section 2 violation was the addition of
judgeships to an already existing, already violative system for the election of judges. In this case, defendant
contends that the proposed voting change is itself a violation of section 2 and that preclearance must therefore
be denied. We are not persuaded. The reasoning used by the prior courts is just as applicable here, regardless
of whether a given voting change is styled as an addition to a system that allegedly violates section 2 or a
violation of section 2 itself...
In its discussion ofthe importation of section 2 into section 5, defendant makes no mention of Miller v.
Johnson. In Miller, the Attorney General denied preclearance for the Georgia General Assembly's
congressional redistricting plan until it provided for three majority-black districts. In finding that the General
Assembly had made race the "predominant factor" in its redistricting and thereby violated the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court held that the manner in which the Attorney General had employed section 5 of
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the Voting Rights Act was "insupportable," and that the Attorney General's incorrect interpretation of section
5 could not be a compelling state interest sufficient to survive strict scrutiny. Although much of the
discussion in Millerconcerns the Equal Protection clause, Miller is very much a statutory interpretation case.
The Supreme Court, rather than decide the constitutional question of whether compliance with the Voting
Rights Act could serve as a compelling state interest, expressly repudiated the Department's interpretation
of section 5. The Court noted that the purpose of section 5 is to avoid retrogression in the position of
minority voters, and stated that the "Justice Department's maximization policy seems quite far removed from
this purpose." . . .
Although Millermakes no explicit reference to the injection of section 2 into section 5, the import of the
opinion on this issue is clear. So long as the standard for the "effect" prong of section 5 remains
"nonretrogression," the only way for defendant to require the creation of additional majority-black districts
before preclearance will be granted is to import the standards of section 2 into the section 5 preclearance
process. The very language with which the Attorney General objected to the School Board's redistricting plan
makes plain that section 2's standards informed the Attorney General's objection to the School Board's plan.
Miller, however, makes crystalline what was already clear: section 2 and its standards have no place in a
section 5 preclearance action.
In what may by now be a conditioned response, defendant argues that even if we decide that a section
2 action cannot be brought in a section 5 preclearance proceeding, we must still consider evidence of a section
2 violation as evidence of discriminatory purpose under section 5. We again disagree. As we have said, the
statutory language sets forth differing standards for the two sections. The line cannot be blurred by allowing
a defendant to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. The federalism costs already exacted by section 5 are
seriously increased if under the guise of "purpose" evidence, alleged section 2 violations must be countered
by the political subdivision whenever it seeks preclearance. And, Miller forecloses the permitting of section
2 evidence in a section 5 case. As a panel of this court recently noted, the Court [in Miller] reaffirmed that
the "purpose" prong of section 5 must be analyzed within the context of section 5's purpose, which "has
always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression
in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Given
the variety of good reasons not to import section 2 into section 5, we will not permit section 2 evidence to
prove discriminatory purpose under section 5.
B.
The parties agree that the proposed redistricting will not result in retrogression of minority voting
strength in Bossier Parish, and thus, that the "effect" prong of Section 5 is not in issue. The statute requires
a covered political subdivision seeking a declaratory judgment to prove that the proposed voting change
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote."
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that it did not adopt the Police Jury plan with a discriminatory
purpose. All courts agree that the entity seeking preclearance has the burden of proving that the proposed
change has neither a discriminatory effect nor a discriminatory purpose.....
Courts have devised complex burden-shifting regimes for litigation under Title VII and section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. In an action under Title VII, a plaintiff complaining of discrimination in the employment
context must set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. At that point, the burden shifts to the employer
to prove that the complained-of employment action was undertaken for other, nondiscriminatory reasons. The
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's offered reasons are pretextual. Similarly,
courts in section 2 cases have held that once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of vote dilution, the
burden shifts to the political subdivision to prove that the voting regime does not result in, or have as its
purpose, discrimination. In actions under both Title VII and section 2, the burden-shifting regimes were
enacted in order to alleviate the difficulty for plaintiffs of proving that defendants acted with discriminatory
intent. These procedural services thus do not appear appropriate to a section 5 case.
To be sure, something like a burden shifting must occur in this, as in every other, civil case.. . .To make
out a prima facie case for preclearance, the School Board must demonstrate that the proposed change will
have no retrogressive effect, and that the change was undertaken without a discriminatory purpose. Proof of
nondiscriminatory purpose must include "legitimate reasons" for settling on the given change. When the
prima facie case has been made by the School Board, defendant must offer evidence in rebuttal in order to
prevent preclearance.
The School Board has offered a host of non-discriminatory reasons for adopting the Police Jury plan. ...
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The Police Jury plan offered the twin attractions of guaranteed preclearance and easy implementation
(because no precinct lines would need redrawing). The School Board did not like the Police Jury plan when
it was first presented to them, and there were certainly reasons not to. The Police Jury plan wreaked havoc
with the incumbencies of four of the School Board members and was not drawn with school locations in
mind. When, however, the redistricting process began to cause agitation within the black community, and
when it became obvious that any plan adopted by the School Board would give rise to controversy and
division (and we find that by the time the NAACP's redistricting plan had been presented to the School
Board, the Board could very reasonably foresee this), the Police Jury plan became, as Board member Myrick
described it, "expedient." Any port will do in a storm, and when the clouds over the School Board's
redistricting process began to grow ominous, the only close port was the already precleared Police Jury plan.
Defendant and defendant-intervenors contend that the Police Jury plan itself was precleared by the
Attorney General only because relevant information was withheld from the Attorney General. In order for
this to be evidence that the School Board adopted the Police Jury plan with an impermissible purpose, the
School Board would have to have known that such information had been withheld from the Attorney General,
and that but for that withholding, the Attorney General would not have precleared the Police Jury plan. We
know of no evidence even suggesting the School Board had any knowledge that the Police Jury plan had been
precleared illegitimately if in fact it had been.
Further, the Police Jury plan would require no splitting of precincts. While the evidence on the effect of
a school board's efforts to redistrict in a way that splits precincts is confused, what is uncontroverted is that
changing precincts is neither guaranteed nor free. The NAACP plan presented to the School Board--the only
other plan available to the school board at the time--split at least 46 precincts. Defendant-intervenors'
witness, David Creed, who testified that precinct-splitting was quite common and that he himself had drawn
several redistricting plans that split precincts had never drawn a plan that split more than eight precincts.
Splitting precincts would have required assistance from the Police Jury-a body that had rebuffed the School
Board's earlier overtures for coordinated efforts. And, the splitting of precincts would have cost
money. . . .the School Board entirely reasonably could have, when faced with the NAACP's plan, arrived
quickly at the conclusion that zero precinct splits was significantly more desirable than 46.
Moreover, in the midst of the controversy, at the behest of the black community, and over the "bitter
opposition" of some white constituents, the School Board itself appointed a black member to its only vacant
seat in time to participate in and vote on the adoption of the Police Jury plan. Defendant tries to minimize
this fact by noting that the vote was only six to five, that Jerome Blunt was appointed to a district that was
89% white, and that Blunt promptly lost in a special election six months later. That Blunt was appointed by
a bare majority tells us nothing more than that at least a majority of the white Board members were
responsive to the black community and were not opposed to black representation on the School Board. That
Blunt lost his next election cannot, we think, be fairly laid at the School Board's door, particularly given that
the district to which he was appointed-again, at the behest of George Price and others--was the only one with
a vacancy. This appointment, particularly when its timing and context are considered, indicates that a
majority ofthe white Board members not only were not opposed to black representation on the School Board,
but affirmatively brought it about for the first time in Parish history.
The School Board thus has presented a prima facie case for preclearance. Defendant seeks to rebut this
case by presenting what it styles as "direct" and "indirect" evidence of discriminatory purpose.
The "direct" evidence presented by defendant and defendant-intervenors consists of the alleged
statements of three School Board members. We conclude that none of the statements attributed to these
Board members, if they were in fact made, show that the Board acted with a discriminatory motivation....
The "indirect" evidence defendant most heavily relies upon is the "sequence of events leading to the
school board's adoption of the police jury plan." Defendant argues that these events raise an inference that
the plan was adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Defendant notes that when the Police Jury plan was first
presented to the Board, the Board declined to adopt it, in part because it pitted two pairs of incumbents
against each other. Defendant also emphasizes the Board's unwillingness to permit participation in the
redistricting process by George Price and the NAACP; most of the redistricting work done by the Board was
not done publicly. And, defendant argues, and regards as the nail in the School Board's coffin, that the Board
"rushed to adopt the police jury plan" only after it "was confronted with the NAACP's plan." If the only
evidence before us were that summarized here and relied on so heavily by the defendant, we would still have
difficulty following its inferential leap. We think that assuming that the quick rejection of the NAACP plan
is probative of a discriminatory purpose requires at least that the Board have regarded the NAACP plan as
a plausible plan. We have no evidence that the plan was, as an objective matter, plausible (after all, it split
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46 precincts and is no longer seriously put forward by either defendant or defendant-intervenors). And, we
have no indication that the School Board itself thought the plan plausible. The existence of the NAACP plan
demonstrated to the Board that its efforts to redistrict would be subject to exacting review and vociferous
criticism. The swift selection of the only plan around that bore the imprimatur of the Attorney General
resembles not a brazen stroke in the name of racist redistricting but an understandable, if not necessarily
laudable, retreat from a protracted and highly charged public battle. In light of this, and mindful of the
Board's demonstrable willingness to ensure black representation on the Board (the creation of a
majority-black district would not necessarily lead to the election of a black Board member, while the
appointment of a black Board member unavoidably would), we think defendant and defendant-intervenors'
inference is unjustified. ...
At bottom, defendant's argument that the School Board's adoption of the Police Jury plan rather than
something like the NAACP plan runs afoul of section 5 is indistinguishable from an argument rejected by
the Court in Miller v. Johnson. Here, defendant argues that the School Board has failed to provide an
adequate reason explaining why it declined to act on a proposal featuring two majority-black districts. In
Miller, the "key to the Government's position .. . is and always has been that Georgia failed to proffer a
nondiscriminatory purpose for its refusal in the first two submissions to take the steps necessary to create
a third majority-minority district" The Supreme Court described this position as "insupportable" and stated
that Georgia's adherence to "other districting principles instead of creating as many majority-minority
districts as possible does not support an inference that the plan 'so discriminates on the basis of race or color
as to violate the Constitution,' and thus cannot provide any basis under § 5 for the Justice Department's
objection." We note that, in Miller,the Department of Justice denied preclearance until the Georgia Assembly
had drawn three of 11 (or 27%) black majority districts in a State with a population that is 27% black. The
Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the Department of Justice was engaged improperly in
"black-maximization" on a theory of section 5 that the Supreme Court rejected. Here, defendant denied
preclearance noting that the Board had adopted the Police Jury plan when it had before it a plan that provided
for two of 12 (or 18%) majority-black districts in a parish with a voting-age population that is 17.6% black.
The key to defendant's position in this case, similarly, is that the School Board has not provided an adequate
explanation for adopting the precleared Police Jury plan when it had before it the NAACP plan. As Miller
makes clear, the adoption of one nonretrogressive plan rather than another nonretrogressive plan that contains
more majority-black districts cannot by itself give rise to the inference of discriminatory purpose. Defendant
here, as it did in Miller,pursues a theory the result of which is that no political subdivision presented with
a plan that provides for x number of majority-black districts can ever adequately explain its reasons for
adopting a plan that provides for x minus n majority-black districts. The Miller Court rejected this theory
of section 5, and we will not resuscitate it here.
Accordingly, we grant plaintiff Bossier Parish School Board the requested declaratory judgment.
ORDER
In this action, plaintiff Bossier Parish School Board requests preclearance of its election plan adopted
on October 1, 1992. In accordance with the Opinion by the Court of even date herewith, and for the reasons
set forth therein, it is by this three-judge court, this 2nd day of November, 1995,
ORDERED that the plaintiff Bossier Parish School Board shall be, and hereby is, given preclearance for
its election plan adopted on October 1, 1992, and shall have a declaratory judgment to that effect.
DISSENT: Judge Kessler, concurring in part and dissenting in part....
The fact that the Board adopted a plan which departs substantively from its earlier districting plans and
which ignores factors it has usually considered of paramount concern, is probative of discriminatory
purpose. . . The most glaring example is that the adopted plan forced incumbents to run against each other.
Incumbency protection has always, understandably, been a high priority for both the Police Jury and School
Board. That was the reason there were different redistricting plans in effect for each entity during the 1980s.
That was also the reason the Police Jury refused to conduct a joint redistricting effort with the school board
after 1990.
Moreover, the plan adopted by the Board contravenes other traditional districting principles. For
example, it creates one district containing almost half of the geographic area in the Paris. Several of its
districts are not compact, according to the Board's own consultant. In addition, the plan creates election
districts without any schools in them and ignores school attendance boundaries. Finally, the plan does not
respect communities of interest in Bossier Parish.
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Perhaps if the Board had ignored one or two of these standard redistricting criteria, it would not be
noteworthy, but when the Board's plan plainly violates a whole number of redistricting principles, we have
further evidence from which to infer that the Board's decision was fueled by discriminatory purpose....
In the face of this considerable evidence, the School Board has offered several reasons for its adoption
of the Police Jury plan. Even the majority admits that a number of these reasons "clearly were not the real
reasons, "i.e., the School Board lied.
For example, at one point, the School Board argued that it adopted the Police Jury plan (on October 1,
1992) to comply with Shaw v. Reno, which was decided nine months after the Board adopted its plan.
Although the Board does not lie as fragrantly in its remaining rationales, they are equally unconvincing.
The School Board claims that it could not adopt any plan with majority-black districts because such a
plan would require precinct-splitting, which violates state law and would be prohibitively expensive. The
evidence shows conclusively, however, that throughout the redistricting process, the School Board was
willing to split precincts to do just that, i.e., to split precincts so long as it was for the protection of
incumbents. It was only after the black community presented its alternative plan that the School Board
proffered the "no precinct-splitting" rationale.
The majority agrees that when "the School Board began the redistricting process, it likely anticipated the
necessity of splitting some precincts." The School Board hired Mr. Joiner at the beginning of the process
to develop the Plan, fully intending that he would split precincts. At the September 5, 1991 School Board
meeting, the first School Board meeting after the Police Jury plan had been precleared by the Department,
Mr. Joiner presented proposed maps that showed split precincts. Further, it is now undisputed by the School
Board that splitting precincts does not violate state law. While the School Board itself may not split precincts,
police juries have the authority to establish and modify precinct lines and many do so when requested by a
school board. The Bossier Parish Police Jury itself created 13 new precincts in 1991 and the School Board
has stipulated that the Police Jury was currently considering consolidating some of its precincts for other
reasons.

...

The final reason offered by the School Board is that the Police Jury plan guaranteed preclearance, that
is, the Department would approve the School Board's plan because it was identical to the Police Jury plan
which was precleared on July 29, 1991. It is clear, however, that "guaranteed preclearance" was not the
School Board's motive as it began the redistricting process, because if so, it would not have waited until
October 1, 1992 -- almost 14 months later -- to adopt the Police Jury plan.....
The Board's rationales simply do not withstand a common-sense reading of the record. Some of the
rationales are untrue on their face, and others do not bear even minimum scrutiny. Most of the alleged
justifications are absent from the public record, so the School Board asks us to accept their post-hoc
rationalizations rather than focus on their motive at the time of the decision. "Invidious purpose may often
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."
The evidence is clear that racial purpose was "a motivating factor in the [Board's] decision" to adopt the
Police Jury plan. The burden of proof is on the School Board to show absence of discriminatory purpose,
and it has woefully failed to satisfy that burden. Its rationales are so flagrantly pretextual as to further
corroborate the conclusion that the School Board acted with discriminatory purpose.....
The evidence in this case demonstrates overwhelmingly that the School Board's decision to adopt the
Police Jury redistricting plan was motivated by discriminatory purpose. The adoption of the Police Jury plan
bears heavily on the black community because it denies its members a reasonable opportunity to elect a
candidate of their choice. The history of discrimination by the Bossier School System and the Parish itself
demonstrates the Board's continued refusal to address the concerns of the black community in Bossier Parish.
The sequence of events leading up to the adoption of the plan illustrate the Board's discriminatory purpose.
The School Board's substantive departures from traditional districting principles is similarly probative of
discriminatory motive. Three School Board members have acknowledged that the Board is hostile to black
representation. Moreover, some of the purported rationales for the School Board's decision are flat-out
untrue, and others are so glaringly inconsistent with the facts of the case that they are obviously pretexts. .
Sometimes we need to step back and look at first principles. Congress passed the Voting Rights Act to
combat the "unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution" by several states, Louisiana among
them. The Bossier School Board continues to resist the Constitution, through its ingenious, if subtle,
discrimination against the black citizens of Bossier parish. We are long past the point where discrimination
can be easily proven by use of racial epithets, racial categories or openly exclusionary voting requirements.
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"The voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the
effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race." Inthis case, the School Board's decision
to adopt the Police Jury plan was a thinly-veiled effort to deny black voters a meaningful opportunity for
representation on the School Board.
The burden is on the School Board to show lack of discriminatory purpose. Because the School Board's
proffered reasons are pretextual, it has not met its burden under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and its
request for pre-clearance must be denied.
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95-1201 LOPEZ v. MONTEREY COUNTY,
CALIF.

Voting Rights Act Section 5-Judicial electionsRemedy.
Ruling below (DC NCalif, 11/1/95):
County's inability to implement permanent
election plan for municipal judges following special election held pursuant to court-ordered,
emergency, interim election plan that used race
as significant factor in dividing county into electoral districts requires court to allow county-wide
election of municipal court judges in 1996 general election for normal, six-year terms but to
enjoin elections thereafter pending preclearance
of permanent plan that complies with Voting
Rights Act and state law.
Questions presented: (1) In action to enforce
Section 5 of Voting Rights Act, can district court
order as temporary election plan at-large election
system, which has not received Section 5 preclearance, for electing judges in political subdivision subject to Section 5 preclearance? (2) In
action to enforce Section 5, can district court
order temporary election plan that does not comply with standards applicable to court-ordered
election plans? (3) In action to enforce Section 5,
are there extreme circumstances justifying use of
temporary, court-ordered election plan incorporating at-large election system for electing judges
that has not received Section 5 preclearance?
Appeal filed 1/29/96, by Joaquin G. Avila, of
Milpitas, Calif., and Barbara Y. Phillips, of University, Miss.
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JUSTICES TAKE UP VOTING RIGHTS SUIT OVER JUDGE RACES
Monterey Case Could Expand Oversight of Election Plans
The Recorder
Tuesday, April 2, 1996
Keith Donoghue

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
consider a young rights suit that aims to open
Monterey County's municipal bench to Latino
judges.
Under the Voting Rights Act states found to
have used discriminatory election systems must get
approval from federal authorities for proposed
remedies. The Monterey case is likely to force the
court to decide whether federal courts designing
such remedies must also get Washington approval.
Filed in 1991, Lopez v. Monterey County,
95-1201, has evolved into a dispute over whether
the county will use at large or district elections to fill
its municipal court bench.
Monterey County's geographically concentrated
Latino population, which in 1990 constituted 34
percent of residents, is more likely to function as a
successful voting bloc under district elections. Last
year, voters elected the county's first two Latino
judges after district elections were ordered by a
panel of two Northern District judges and one Ninth
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals judge.
The high cour's order Monday "fits in the trend
that the court is taking a lot of voting cases and
hasn't heard off them yet" said Marina Hsieh, an
acting professor at Boalt Hall School of Law who
has taught courses on the Voting Rights Act.

race-based redistricting plan in Georgia was
unconstitutional unless the plan was "narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling interest."
The complicated procedural history in the
Monterey case, however, could mean the Supreme
Court is interested solely in resolving a much more
specific question: whether a federal court trying to
fix a discriminatory electoral system must, like state
legislatures, run its remedy by Washington
authorities for approval.
In December 1994, in order to avoid further
delay in municipal court elections, the district court
panel ordered Monterey County to implement a
temporary district election plan. The county
submitted the plan to the Justice Department, which
approved it in March 1995. The ensuing district
elections produced two Latino judges, who are
serving terms that expire next January.
But the three-judge panel overseeing Lopez v.
Monterey had a change of heart with the Supreme
Court's publication of the Miller decision.
Scrapping the district elections system, Ninth
Circuit Judge Mary Schroeder and Northern District
Judges Ronald Whyte and James Ware reinstated an
at-large scheme for elections originally slated for
last week.

While the court is likely to issue a narrow
ruling, Hsieh said, some of the justices might want
to use the case to curb federal oversight of states
that run afoul of the Voting Rights Act.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court
under a special provision of the Voting Rights Act
that allows litigants to bypass federal appellate
courts. In February, the plaintiffs won a stay of the
scheduled at-large election.

The federal bodies charged with approving
election remedies are the U.S. Department of Justice
or the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.
A QUESTION OF AUTHORITY

Joaquin Avila, a Milpitas solo practitioner
representing the four Latino community activists
who brought Lopez, said he will ask the three-judge
panel to extend the judges' terms while the Supreme
Court considers the case.

In recent years the Supreme Court has drawn
attention with a series of rulings in congressional
elections that many civil rights advocates say are
undermining the Voting Rights Act. Chief among
these rulings is Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475,
a 1995 case in which the court held that a
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"We're not dealing with any race-based
districting," said Avila. "We're only challenging the
district cour's ability to implement an election
change" - the return to an at-large system - that

has not been approved by federal authorities.

Stephen Sillman, the presiding judge of
Monterey Municipal Court, is intervening in the
case. James Parrinello, a partner at Nielsen,
Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor who is
representing the judge, said Sillman and other
Monterey Municipal Court judges are intervening to
argue for a resolution that does not wreak undue
havoc on the court.
The California attorney general's office has
argued that the district elections plan runs afoul of
the California Constitution because it divides the
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city of Salinas, according to the plaintiffs' Supreme
Court brief.
If the Supreme Court does eventually reinstate
the use of municipal court districts in Monterey
County, the districts would be smaller than the
average across California In the 13 counties that
currently have more than one municipal court
district, there are an average of 321,000 people per
district. Monterey's county-wide population is only
371,000.
The San Francisco Recorder Copyright 1996

Vicky M. LOPEZ, Crescencio Padilla, William A. Melendez
Jesse G. Sanchez, and David Serena, Plaintiffs,
V.

MONTEREY COUNTY, California, Defendant;
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
871 F. Supp. 1254; 1994
December 20, 1994
...
Ronald M. Whyte, United States District Judge, On Behalf of the Panel
I.INTRODUCTION
This is a case in which the plaintiffs challenged the implementation of six Monterey County ordinances
on the ground that they were not precleared as required by the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The
ordinances consolidated two municipal and seven justice court districts into a single municipal court district
with the judges being elected at large from the entire county. The court previously determined that the
ordinances were subject to preclearance and that preclearance had not been obtained. The County then
sought preclearance but discontinued its effort stipulating that it could not establish that the consolidation
ordinances did not have the effect of denying the right to vote to Latinos as a result of the retrogressive effect
that consolidation had on Latino voting strength. Pursuant to this court's order which included an injunction
prohibiting an election pending adoption and preclearance of an election plan, the County next attempted to
secure an amendment to the California Constitution regarding the configuration of districts, so it could
implement an election plan that complied with the Voting Rights Act and did not violate any provision of
California law. The County was unsuccessful. The question now facing the court is what remedy, under the
circumstances, is appropriate.
II. SUMMARY OF CURRENT ISSUE BEFORE COURT AND DECISION THEREON
Plaintiffs and Monterey County urge the court to allow elections to take place under a plan that would
involve maintaining the current single, county-wide district but with election areas. This plan would eliminate
linkage between the judges' jurisdictional and electoral bases and would split the City of Salinas into two
areas for election purposes. However, it would allow the County to continue its current administrative scheme
for the county-wide operation of the municipal courts. As an alternative, plaintiffs and the County ask that
the court authorize the County to implement a plan which would include more than one district and would
split the City of Salinas. This plan would require substantial administrative changes in the operation of the
courts. The State of California and Municipal Court Judge Fields, both of whom have intervened, object to
the proposals made as unnecessarily intrusive on state interests.
For the reasons set forth below, the court hereby continues its injunction prohibiting Monterey County
from holding elections for municipal court judges pending adoption and preclearance of a permanent plan,
except the court orders that a special election be held in 1995 to protect the rights of the citizens to elect
judges while a permanent legislative solution is being developed and precleared. The court-ordered special
election will be held pursuant to an election area plan, specifically the "Municipal Court Division Plan" as
described in the Second Stipulation presented to the court by plaintiffs and the County on January 13, 1994.
The terms of the judges elected will expire on the first Monday in January 1997.
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1968, Monterey County had two municipal and seven justice court districts. By ordinances
enacted by the County between 1968 and 1983, those districts were consolidated so as to provide for one
municipal court district with judges elected at large from the entire county. The consolidation ordinances were
subject to review under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and, on September 6, 1991, plaintiffs herein filed
this Section 5 enforcement action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the County to seek
preclearance of the ordinances before enforcing them further. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, the case was
assigned to this three-judge court. On March 31, 1993, this court found that the ordinances did, in fact,
require preclearance, that such preclearance had not been obtained, and that the ordinances could not be
enforced without preclearance. In response to the court's order, the County, on August 10, 1993, filed a
declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to obtain
after-the-fact preclearance of the ordinances. That action was subsequently dismissed upon a stipulation that
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"the Board of Supervisors is unable to establish that the Municipal Court Judicial Court Consolidation
Ordinances adopted by the County between 1968 and 1983 did not have the effect of denying the right to
vote to Latinos in Montery County due to the retrogressive effect several of these ordinances had on Latino
voting strength in Monterey County." Monterey County.
Monterey County and plaintiffs then agreed to the implementation of an "Election Area Plan" for the
election of municipal court judges and requested that this court order the County to adopt the system. The
Election Area Plan consisted of seven election areas which were specific geographic areas in which only the
residents could vote. The areas we to be used solely for election purposes and there would remain only one
county-wide municipal court district for all other purposes. The parties acknowledged that the plan might
conflict with Article VI, Section 16(b) of the California Constitution, since it removed the linkage between
a judge's electoral and jurisdictional bases. They asked the court to authorize the County to adopt the plan
and the County stated that it would then seek preclearance. The State of California asked to intervene and
objected to the issuance of an order authorizing the plan. The court, by order dated December 22, 1993,
allowed the State to intervene and declined without prejudice to approve the proposed Election Area Plan
because it was not satisfied that a plan necessarily had to conflict with the California Constitution in order
to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Judge Michael S. Fields, a municipal court judge, was also allowed
to intervene in his personal capacity.
On January 13, 1994 the County submitted a new stipulation and proposed order in response to the
court's order of December 22, 1993. The new proposed plan, entitled "Municipal Court Division Plan," called
for four divisions. The divisions, like the areas in the previously proposed Election Area Plan, were specific
geographic areas in which only the residents could vote. The divisions were to be used solely for election
purposes and not for assignment of cases, court locations, or any other purpose. Plaintiffs and the County
suggested that the Division Plan did not violate the state constitution, but requested the court to approve it
even if it felt otherwise. The State and Judge Fields objected to acceptance of the Division Plan on the basis,
among others, that it violated Article VI, Section 16(b) of the California Constitution, which requires that
judges be elected in their counties or districts. In its order dated February 28, 1994 the court again stated that
it was not satisfied that an election plan had to conflict with the California Constitution in order to meet the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act and implicitly held that the Division Plan in fact did so conflict. The
court further ordered that the County submit for preclearance an election plan that complied with the Voting
Rights Act and all applicable provisions of the California Constitution and state law, or show cause why it
could not do so.
On March 31, 1994, in a hearing to show cause, the County explained why it could not submit the
requested plan for preclearance and referred to Board of Supervisors' Resolution 94-107, which made certain
findings supporting the Board's conclusion that "the Board of Supervisors is unable to devise or prepare any
plan for the election of municipal court judges in Monterey County that does not conflict with at least one
state law and still comply with the Voting Rights Act." On June 1, 1994 the court issued its order enjoining
Monterey County from holding elections for municipal court judges pending adoption and preclearance of
a plan for their election. The County was ordered to take the necessary steps to obtain changes in existing
state law and county ordinances to effectuate such a plan. The parties were also ordered to appear on
November 3, 1994 to report on their progress.
Following the court's order of June 1, 1994, the County made a good faith effort to secure passage of an
amendment to the California Constitution regarding the configuration of municipal court districts in
Monterey County. The efforts were unsuccessful for reasons that appear unrelated to any controversy
regarding the proposed amendment. Plaintiffs and Monterey County now urge the court to allow elections
to take place under the Municipal Court Division Plan which they had proposed to the court on January 13,
1994. As an alternative, they ask that the court authorize the County to implement a plan which would
include districts that split cities.
IV. ANALYSIS
The final step for the three-judge court is to determine "what remedy is appropriate." Section 5
contemplates injunctive relief, which is by its nature equitable. Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated
that the three-judge court has some limited discretion in fashioning a remedy by directing that the court must
fashion an "appropriate" remedy.
Since the County did not obtain preclearance for the consolidating ordinances it enacted after 1968, this
court must enjoin elections under those ordinances. The question that remains then is how, under the existing
circumstances, should the court further "fashion an appropriate remedy" under its equitable powers. A return
to the system that was last in effect before the adoption of the unprecleared ordinances is impractical and no
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party seems to seriously advocate that even as an interim solution. Continuance of the injunction without any
election pending implementation of a precleared system would deprive the voters of their right to elect judges.
Obviously, the court cannot overlook the importance of the citizens' right to elect judges while a permanent
legislative solution is being developed and precleared. A memorandum dated January 11, 1994 from the
Registrar of Voters shows that seven of the ten judicial offices would have been up for election in 1994 but
for the preclearance problem and the court's injunction. As noted in Wise v. Lipscomb: Legislative bodies
should not leave their reapportionment tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative
responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it impractical for them to do so,
it becomes the "unwelcome obligation" of the federal court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan
pending later legislative action.
Therefore, the court concludes that its remedy must allow for an election pending the implementation of
a permanent legislative solution. The interim election plan shall call for a special election in 1995 that is not
unduly intrusive on state law and policies and not unreasonably disruptive to the County's interests in
effective and efficient delivery of municipal court services. Under the Supremacy Clause, the implementation
of relief for a violation of the Voting Rights Act must take precedence over enforcement of state law that
stands in the way of effective relief. The terms of those elected, however, will expire on the first Monday in
January 1997, so that the County understands that it must have a permanent solution in effect by the time
of the next general election or it will risk being without judges.
The court is satisfied that there are only two viable alternatives for an interim, emergency election plan.
One is to authorize the County to implement an interim plan which includes districts that split the City of
Salinas. This would require the court to "suspend" application of Article VI, Section 5 of the California
Constitution in order to allow compliance with the Voting Rights Act. This approach is favored by the State
and Judge Fields over the second alternative discussed below, although the State contends that there is no
basis for the court to relieve the County from any of the state's constitutional restrictions.
The other alternative is to permit the County to implement a temporary election plan that is predicated
on the Municipal Court Division Plan such as described in the Second Stipulation submitted to the court in
January 1994. Under this plan, a judge's jurisdictional and electoral bases would not be coterminous. This
plan would require the "suspension" of Article VI, Section 16(b) of the California Constitution. It would also
require the splitting of the City of Salinas.
The court has considered in analyzing alternatives for an interim plan the recent en banc decision in
Nipper v. Smith, in which black voters and an association of black attorneys contended that the use of
at-large elections in trial court jurisdictions diluted the voting strength of the black minority in violation of
Section 2 ofthe Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). The court found that plaintiffs had established vote
dilution, but that none of the remedies sought provided an objectively reasonable and workable solution to
the vote dilution and that they would actually undermine the court's ability to administer justice. The
proposed remedies included alternatives of electoral subdistricts and the creation of new circuits which would
contain sufficient black voters to enable them to elect a candidate of their choice.
In the present case, the court is not faced with deciding whether a voting scheme violates Section 2. It
is presented with the problem of what interim solution should be implemented pending the legislative
enactment of a precleared voting plan. Evidence has been offered that Latino voters have had their voting
strength diluted and, therefore, a special election under an at-large system would probably preclude them
from electing any judge of their choice. On the other hand, persuasive evidence has not been offered that the
court's ability to administer justice would be undermined by the two alternatives under consideration. The
court, however, acknowledges that ultimately an at-large system or a system different from either of the two
proposed alternatives may prove, under the totality of circumstances, to be the best judicial election scheme.
The prohibition against dividing a city into more than one district is set forth in Article VI, Section 5(a)
of the California Constitution which provides in part: "Each county shall be divided into municipal court and
justice court districts as provided by statute, but a city may not be divided into more than one district." The
State's interest in preventing the division of cities does not appear to reflect any compelling state policy. In
fact, the City of San Diego has been specifically authorized to divide cities if "the Legislature determines that
unusual geographic conditions warrant such division." However, the creation of a multidistrict plan in
Monterey County would require substantial administrative changes which would necessarily include
reassignment of personnel, setting up new administrative procedures and the like. Further, these changes
might be in effect for only the time period preceding the adoption of a permanent precleared plan. The court,
therefore, finds that while a one-time, temporary suspension of the application of the city splitting prohibition
would not interfere with a compelling state interest, implementation of a temporary multidistrict municipal
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court district plan would significantly interfere with the County's ability to provide uninterrupted efficient
and effective delivery of municipal court services.
The proposed division plan allows the County to continue administratively operating the municipal
courts in the county as it currently does. The problem, of course, is that the plan involves a separation of the
electoral and jurisdictional bases of municipal court judges. Article VI, Section 16 provides that "judges of
[municipal] courts shall be elected in their counties or districts at general elections." Therefore, this division
or election area plan denies residents of the Monterey County Municipal Court District the right to vote for
some of the judges in the county-wide district. At first glance, this would seem to constitute a substantial
intrusion on state interests. As the State points out, historically, municipal and small claims courts have been
intended to be responsive to the ordinary affairs of the citizens of their districts. Several courts have noted
that linkage between electoral and jurisdictional bases is a recognized state interest: "The overwhelming
preservation of linkage in states that elect their trial court judges demonstrates that district-wide elections
are integral to the judicial office and not simply another electoral alternative."
However, on closer analysis the intrusion on state law does not seem as substantial as it initially appears.
The process of municipal courts extends throughout the state, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 84, and, therefore, the
jurisdiction of a municipal court judge extends outside the geographic limits of the judge's district. In
addition, Article VI, Section 15 of the California Constitution provides that "[a] judge eligible for municipal
court service may be assigned by the Chief Justice to serve on any court." This provision authorizes the Chief
Justice to assign municipal court judges from one municipal court district to serve in other municipal court
districts. Sometimes the Chief Justice issues "blanket assignments." As noted in the 1994 Annual Report of
the Judicial Council of California:
Blanket (within county) and reciprocal (between counties) assignments are issued each year by the Chief
Justice to permit judges of one court to sit as judges of another court within their county or in a
neighboring county. A total of 193 blanket assignments and 73 reciprocal assignments were issued
during fiscal year 1992-93.
These facts show that in practice the rights of nonresidents are often judged by resident judges. Also,
nonresident judges are frequently assigned to other districts. Therefore, as a practical matter, linkage between
a judge's electoral and jurisdictional bases cannot be considered an overwhelmingly strong public policy. The
district court in Cousin v. McWherter so recognized in holding that the use of a single, at-large district for
election of voters violated the Voting Rights Act:
The Court finds that this policy underlying the practice of county wide election for judges is tenuous if
a totality of circumstances test is utilized. Any voter in any number of different situations may be subjected
to the jurisdiction of ajudge for which they had no opportunity to vote such as a federal judge, or ajudge in
another county or another state. Judges routinely respond to litigants who will not have the opportunity to
vote for the judge in an election. There is never a guarantee that jurisdiction and electorate will be
coextensive.
The dissenting judges in Nipper also questioned the importance of linkage as a component of state
policy. Although an election division plan as proposed will undoubtedly cause more parties to have their
cases heard by judges who did not elect them, there is no strict linkage presently existing in California courts.
The concern of the State and Judge Fields that an election area plan may violate the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment seems unfounded. No case has been cited which comes to that
conclusion. However, several courts have remedied violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in cases
involving at-large or circuit-wide judicial election systems by ordering the use of election sub-districts that
are not coterminous to the jurisdictional bases of the elected judges.
The court, therefore, concludes that the Municipal Court Division Plan, as an interim plan, minimally
intrudes on state interests and enables the County to maintain its current administrative operation of the
municipal courts while it is working for a permanent legislative solution to its Voting Rights Act problem.
The calendar for such an election is set forth in the memorandum of the Registrar of Voters to County
Counsel dated October 4, 1994.
Although a federal court's authorization of the emergency, interim use of a court-created election plan
does not normally require preclearance, such preclearance is required when the covered jurisdiction submits
a proposal reflecting its policy choices irrespective of what constraints have limited the choices available to
it. Since the court-ordered plan here is based upon a proposal submitted by the County, the County may be
statutorily required to seek preclearance of the plan, even though it is only an interim, court-directed plan.
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This should present no obstacle, however, as the Attorney General is apparently prepared to give expedited
approval.
V. ORDER
1. Monterey County is ordered to develop a permanent plan for the election of municipal court judges
which complies with the Voting Rights Act and does not violate state law. The County shall take any steps
required to obtain changes in existing state law and county ordinances.
2. Monterey County is hereby enjoined from holding elections for municipal court judges pending
adoption and preclearance of a permanent plan or further order of this court.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 above, the County shall implement as a court-ordered, emergency,
interim plan for a special election in 1995 the election plan set forth in the Second Stipulation presented to
the court by Plaintiffs and the County on January 13, 1994 with a new election calendar as set forth in the
memorandum of the Registrar of Voters to the County Counsel dated October 4, 1994. The terms of office
of those elected pursuant to the interim plan shall expire on the first Monday in January 1997. The court
foresees that a permanent, precleared plan will be implemented in time for the next general election in 1996.
The court retains jurisdiction over the implementation of the court-ordered, interim plan.
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